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AN ANTITRUST APPROACH TO
CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
RONALD J. COLOMBO †
INTRODUCTION
The scope and contours of religious liberty in the United
States have never been entirely clear.
Some clarity was
interjected in 1990 when the United States Supreme Court
attempted to render a definitive interpretation of the Free
The Court explained that the First
Exercise Clause. 1
Amendment does not grant the faithful an automatic exemption
from laws of general applicability, 2 but rather merely enables
legislatures to promulgate accommodations within their
discretion. 3 The effect of this decision was, in part, short-lived,
as it prompted Congress in 1993 to enact the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”)—a global exemption from all past and
prospective federal legislation—that Americans could assert
under appropriate circumstances. 4 Although RFRA complicated
the situation, it would be incorrect to accuse the statute of
muddying the jurisprudential waters to the state they were in
prior to 1990. 5 More accurately, RFRA substituted a broader,
legislative approach to religious liberty in place of a narrower,
judicial approach to religious liberty.

†
Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I
wish to thank Thomas Lambert and Stephen Smith for their helpful critiques of an
earlier draft, and Steven Mare for his valuable research assistance. I also wish to
thank my colleagues at the School of Law for providing me with an opportunity to
present a draft of this paper before them, and for the feedback received therefrom.
1
See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2
See id. at 878–80.
3
See id. at 890.
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). Although RFRA was not explicitly limited to
federal legislation, it was subsequently curtailed by the Supreme Court decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
5
Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIG., 531, 532–33 (1993).
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In 2014, in a development unexpected by many, the Supreme
Court held that RFRA’s broad religious liberty protections extend
not only to private individuals, but to for-profit business
corporations as well. 6 This has opened a Pandora’s Box of fears,
as businesses are subject to a plethora of significant regulation
that ordinary individuals are not.
Rising to the top of this list of fears is anxiety over the future
of certain equality-based, statutory protections for consumers
and employees. More specifically, corporate free exercise rights
are often seen as undermining our nation’s antidiscrimination
laws, as well as regulations designed to ensure ready access to
contraception. 7 These concerns deserve to be taken seriously.
What also deserves to be taken seriously are the religious
liberty protections contained in RFRA as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. At a minimum, RFRA gives rise to a set of
statutorily created rights no less valuable, objectively speaking,
than those created by our nation’s antidiscrimination and
Moreover, given the historical
contraceptive access laws. 8
interpretation and legislative history of the First Amendment,
one would be on solid ground in arguing that RFRA indeed
“restored” religious liberty rights as its name suggests, bestowing
upon RFRA’s protections a weighty constitutional pedigree. 9

6
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014). This
was not unexpected by everyone, however. See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked
Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 87–88 (2013).
7
E.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case That Threatens Women’s
Rights and Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641, 678 (2015); see
Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and – and Among – Civil Rights:
Separation, Tolerance, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 501 (2015);
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48
B.C. L. REV. 781, 786 (2007). In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rights
Comm’n, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari over the question: “Does the
application of Colorado’s public accommodations law to compel a cake maker to
design and make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about samesex marriage violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment?” Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111 (last visited Mar. 21, 2018); see also,
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. den.,
2016 WL 1545027 (Colo. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (U.S. June 26, 2017)
(No. 16-111).
8
Indeed, as Richard Garnett has eloquently argued, religious freedom is not
properly juxtaposed against civil rights, but is most appropriately understood as
another fundamental civil right itself. See Garnett, supra note 7, at 497.
9
See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, few commentators seem genuinely willing to
take both sets of rights, those established or restored by RFRA,
and those established to advance equality, seriously.
Immediately apparent from any review of the literature or
commentary on the subject is that two distinct sides have formed,
with each possessing little understanding or empathy for the
other. 10 This article hopes to buck that trend, proceeding from
the perspective that the worthiness of each set of rights demands
a solution in which no one set predominates via the
marginalization of the other, offering a path forward in which the
law endeavors to balance these competing rights, rather than
subjugate one set to another. Such a path can be forged from the
insights and wisdom of U.S. antitrust law. For antitrust law
struggles with a balancing act of its own: that of promoting
vigorous competition on the one hand while prohibiting
competition that is “unreasonable” or “unfair” on the other.
In a free market economy, businesses are expected, and
indeed relied upon, to compete fiercely against one another.
Such competition is generally deemed good for consumers and
the economy as a whole. This must be distinguished from
competition that is deemed “unreasonable,” or in some cases
“unfair,” an antitrust term of art that refers to undertakings that
are injurious to consumer welfare in the long run if not in the
short run as well. The line between these two concepts, of
reasonable and vigorous competition versus unreasonable and
injurious competition, can be extremely fine. Indeed, the very
same conduct can be deemed reasonable versus unreasonable, or
fair versus unfair, depending upon its attendant circumstances.
Most significant among these circumstances is the concept of
“market power.”
Roughly, market power signifies a business firm’s ability to
control the price of a given good or service, a power usually
restricted by the dynamism of competition. 11 Under antitrust
law, a firm with market power is subject to certain limitations on
its conduct that a firm without market power is not. This is
because whether a given course of conduct would be injurious to
10
There are a number of notable exceptions to this trend. See, e.g., Douglas
Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoe Robinson, eds.
2016).
11
See infra Part II.D.
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consumer welfare oftentimes turns upon the economic dominance
of the actor in question. Thus, a firm lacking market power has a
freer hand in competing against its rivals or potential rivals,
than does, for example, a monopolist, the paradigmatic firm with
market power.
This Article suggests that antitrust law’s concept of market
power could similarly be employed in balancing the free exercise
rights of a corporation or any for-profit business venture against
the rights of individuals. 12 When a business enterprise seeks a
religious liberty exemption from a rights-granting law, a major
factor in assessing its claim should be the degree to which it
wields market power in the relevant market. If the business is a
monopolist, and, a fortiori, wielding tremendous market power,
its claim for a free exercise exemption should probably fail. If,
conversely, the business is but a minor marketplace participant,
wielding little or no market power, its claim for a free exercise
exemption, if meritorious, should usually succeed. In practical
terms, such an approach to religious liberty would allow
corporate free exercise claims to prevail most typically in those
situations in which consumers or employees had sufficient
alternative choices to obtain the goods, services, or employment
in question elsewhere. Under such circumstances, the need for
the government to protect the rights of consumers and employees
regarding discrimination or contraceptive access is at its nadir.
However, when consumers or employees lack sufficient
alternative choices, and are beholden to a particular corporation
because of that firm’s market power, the need for government
protection of consumer and employee rights is at its zenith.
Here, the equality-based rights of these individuals would
typically trump the religious liberty rights of the corporation. 13
This Article treats interchangeably all business organizations, ranging from
the sole proprietor to the business corporation. Indeed, the expression employed,
“corporate free exercise,” is intended to cover the religious liberty claims of all forprofit enterprises. This decision was made in full recognition that strong arguments
could be made in support of differentiating among religious liberty claims brought by
sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. See infra Part III.D.
13
Others, most notably Robert Vischer, have previously asserted that in
assessing religious liberty exemptions against third-party interests, the law ought to
take into account the availability of other firms willing and capable of satisfying
such interests. See ROBERT VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD 4–6,
174–75 (2010). But to my knowledge, neither Dean Vischer nor any other
commentator has attempted to ground this assertion upon the insights or principles
of antitrust law. Richard Epstein has articulated a theory of antidiscrimination law
12
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This Article shall proceed as follows in fleshing out the
proposal set forth above: Part I will trace the development and
present the current reach of corporate free exercise rights. Part
II will address United States antitrust law, providing first a
summary of its background and general operation, and thereafter
focusing upon the concept of market power and its role in
antitrust jurisprudence. Part III will use the concept of market
power to construct a compromise approach to the problem of
corporate free exercise rights.
I.

CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE

The rise of corporate free exercise rights has served to graft
one controversial phenomenon upon another controversial
phenomenon. Namely, corporate free exercise rights adjoin the
hotly contested issue of corporate constitutional rights to the
complicated question of the reach, intent, and meaning of the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. This Part will briefly
explore each phenomenon and their recent convergence.
A.

The Free Exercise Clause

As is well known, the United States was colonized and
founded, in no small part, by pilgrims looking for a land on which
they could live out their faiths in peace and freedom. 14 Some,

pursuant to which the “antidiscrimination norm” ought only apply to monopolies—
especially legal monopolies. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 79–80 (1992). In an essay, he more
recently applied his thinking, in passing, to the religious liberty rights of businesses.
See Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An
Imperfect Reconciliation, LIBERTY FORUM (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.libertylaw
site.org/liberty-forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-law-animperfect-reconciliation/ [hereinafter Epstein, Freedom of Association]. Although
there is much from Professor Epstein’s scholarship that bears upon the present
article, Professor Epstein does not use antitrust law, or antitrust principles
generally, to help flesh out the proper contours of corporate religious liberty. Rather,
drawing from natural law, common law, and economic principles, Professor Epstein
makes the argument that outside some very narrow exceptions—essentially legal
monopolies, as mentioned—modern antidiscrimination law does more harm than
good. See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 496–97.
14
See, e.g., THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 22–28 (2006); Brett G.
Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1230 (“The
pursuit of religious liberty was one of the most powerful forces driving early settlers
to the American continent and remained a powerful force at the time of the founding
of the American republic.”).
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such as Roger Williams in Rhode Island, founded communities
with a degree of religious freedom simply unheard of for their
time. 15
It is also well known that in short order, some of the
persecuted became persecutors themselves. 16 That is, those
fleeing religious persecution in England frequently established
settlements in America that, in turn, persecuted religious
dissenters almost as vigorously. 17
Marked by such beginnings, it is perhaps not surprising that
the American experiment with religious liberty has long suffered
from a certain lack of clarity. The very text in which religious
liberty was ultimately enshrined, that of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, remains subject to vociferous
debate over both intent and meaning. 18 The language is not
pellucid and the historical record is arguably inconclusive. 19 This
spawned a religious liberty jurisprudence from which, as
Professor Laurence Tribe remarked in 1988, it seems “impossible
to divine a coherent set of principles to explain.” 20
Two clauses of the First Amendment serve to safeguard
religious liberty in the United States: the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause.
These laconic clauses are
conjoined in the opening words of the Amendment: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 21
The Establishment Clause, at a minimum, prohibits the
federal government from designating a particular religion as the
country’s national faith. 22 Due to the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment
Clause prohibits state governments from adopting particular
See BAILEY, supra note 14, at 28.
Id. at 26.
17
See Michael P. Farris, Facing Facts: Only a Constitutional Amendment Can
Guarantee Religious Freedom for All, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 689, 689 (1999).
18
See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then
And Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1607–08.
19
See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155–66 (2nd ed.
1988).
20
Id. at 1264. See also Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 315–17 (1986).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22
See Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in
Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 564 (2011).
15
16
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faiths of their own as well. 23 Although the Framers held
divergent beliefs regarding religion and its role in society, a
consensus seems to have existed among them that prohibition of
an established church was essential “to protect the liberty of
conscience of religious dissenters from the coercive power of
government.” 24
Whereas the Establishment Clause works indirectly to
protect religious liberty, the Free Exercise Clause provides direct
protection. This portion of the First Amendment precludes the
federal government and, after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, state governments, from prohibiting the “free
exercise” of religion. 25 The contours of what exactly constitutes
the “free exercise” of religion have been the subject of
considerable speculation and debate.
To some scholars, “free exercise” was adopted for “the
prevention and eradication of discrimination against unpopular
religions and religionists.” 26 Pursuant to this line of thought, the
First Amendment does not provide protection against “facially
neutral laws passed in the absence of overt religious hostility.” 27
What the First Amendment prohibits are laws intended to
regulate an individual’s religious beliefs qua religious beliefs and
an individual’s religious conduct qua religious conduct.
Most scholars, however, read the original intent of the
Framers more broadly.
As they have explained, religious
conscience was sacrosanct to the Framers and the First

See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 316.
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 350 (2002). In our own times, many Western nations continue to
maintain official, state-sponsored churches, including Norway (Lutheranism), Malta
(Catholicism), and Greece (Greek Orthodoxy). See David M. Smolin, Exporting the
First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the International Religious
Freedom Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 685, 688 (2000-2001). None of these countries are
known to be hotbeds of religious persecution. Nevertheless, the First Amendment’s
Framers can be forgiven for conflating the establishment of religion with the
suppression of conscience and religious liberty in light of Europe’s history,
particularly England’s, around the time of America’s colonization. See J. M.
ROBERTS, THE NEW PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 552–61 (5th ed. 2007).
25
See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 117 (1992).
26
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality,
Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189,
1259 (2008).
27
Id. at 1273.
23
24
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Amendment was designed to robustly protect this conscience. 28
Since conscience manifests itself in both thought and deed, these
scholars read the First Amendment as protecting religiously
motivated conduct even if such conduct was not specifically
targeted for circumscription on account of its religious nature. 29
Such protection manifests itself via the “compelling state
interest” test. 30 Under this test, religious claimants are entitled
to a judicially crafted exemption from any law that substantially
burdens their religious conduct unless: (1) the law furthers a
compelling state interest and (2) the law’s formulation represents
the least restrictive means by which the government can further
its compelling interest to minimize any burden upon religious
exercise. 31
The intractable debate over the Free Exercise Clause’s
proper interpretation has been fueled, in no small part, by a
historical record and a legislative history that are not entirely
clear. 32 Not surprisingly, this, in turn, contributed to a series of
Supreme Court cases in which the Court’s reading of the Free
Exercise Clause was difficult to discern. 33
As referenced in the introduction, however, the Supreme
Court tried to bring clarity to the issue in 1990 with its 5-4 ruling
In Smith, the Court
in Employment Division v. Smith. 34
attempted to definitively adopt a narrow approach to
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. The Court held that,
outside of a limited set of situations that implicated multiple
constitutional freedoms, such as “hybrid” cases, the Free Exercise
Clause does not provide protection against laws of general
applicability that only infringe upon religious conduct by
happenstance. 35 Thus, ordinarily, a law of general applicability
is as binding upon an individual whose religious conduct it
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. Rev. 1409, 1449–66 (1990). See also Philip
Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 839 (2004).
29
See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 856–57.
30
See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 863, 902 (1988).
31
See id.
32
See McConnell, supra note 28, at 1414, 1511–13; see also RONALD J.
COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 140–43 (2015).
33
See Tribe, supra note 19, at 1168–79, 1193–1201, 1202–04, 1253–75
(discussing the Court’s free exercise precedent).
34
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–879 (1990).
35
See id. at 881–82.
28
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infringes as upon any other individual. 36 Put differently, the
Court explicitly rejected the argument that the Free Exercise
Clause requires the courts to subject any law that substantially
burdens religious conduct to the compelling government interest
In writing for the Court’s majority, Justice Scalia
test. 37
explained:
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities . . . . To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. 38

Consequently, under the First Amendment, laws of general
applicability are deemed enforceable if they can be defended via
recourse to a “rational basis,” a low hurdle to clear, even as
applied against individuals whose religious exercise is
encroached upon by those laws. 39
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
An important component of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Smith was its endorsement of legislative accommodations. 40
Although the Court did not interpret the First Amendment as
requiring judicially crafted exemptions from laws of general
applicability that burden religious conduct, it made clear that the
First
Amendment certainly permits
legislatures
and
governmental entities to craft such exemptions and
accommodations of their own. 41 Taking up this invitation, in a

See id. at 882.
See id.
38
Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
39
The Court in Smith did not expressly articulate the appropriate test against
which laws of general applicability ought to be assessed, but subsequent courts and
commentators have interpreted the Court as having applied the rational basis test.
E.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In Employment Division v.
Smith, the Court analyzed a free exercise of religion claim under a rational basis
test. Under this test, a rationally based, neutral law of general applicability does not
violate the right to free exercise of religion even though the law incidentally burdens
a particular religious belief or practice.”) (citations omitted).
40
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
41
See id.
36
37

FINAL_COLOMBO

38

9/13/2018 11:15 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:29

show of sweeping bipartisanship, Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed into law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) in 1993. 42
RFRA’s legislative history makes clear that this Act was no
typical legislative accommodation. Rather, it was a scathing
indictment of the Smith decision, which Congress excoriated for
misreading both the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s
own precedent:
The Congress finds that—
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the
First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise
as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests. 43

In its operative sections, RFRA spells out the compelling
government interest test and its application as follows:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
The House of Representatives passed RFRA unanimously and the Senate
passed RFRA by a vote of 97-3. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 160
(1997).
43
42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1(a) (2012), quoted in Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked
Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013).
42
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(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense
under this section shall be governed by the general rules of
standing under article [sic] III of the Constitution. 44

Congress’s findings, and the approach it adopted, were well
founded.
As previously indicated, most scholars had long
understood the Free Exercise Clause to protect religious conduct
more robustly than did the majority opinion in Smith. 45 Further,
the Congressional report largely echoed the dissenting opinion of
the four justices in Smith, who explained:
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a
consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of
a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. Such a
statute may stand only if the law in general, and the State’s
refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified
by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive
means. 46

Thus, as a result of RFRA, Americans are afforded a broad
measure of religious liberty rights, but as a matter of legislative
largesse—not out of some clear constitutional imperative. An
individual whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by
government may seek an exemption from the government’s
action, and that exemption is to be granted unless the
government can demonstrate a compelling interest pursued via
the least restrictive means. This protection is not mandated by
the Free Exercise Clause, but rather by Congress as per the
requirements of RFRA.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. Part of the confusion inherent
in the Court’s pre-Smith case law was its practice of articulating a standard of
“strict scrutiny” with regard to laws that infringed upon religious exercise while
applying a standard that, in fact, was not very strict. See Abner S. Greene, Religious
Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle Ground? 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 161, 176 (2015). Consequently, it has been said that RFRA did not “restore”
religious liberty to its pre-Smith status quo, but rather implemented a significantly
more protective approach. See id. at 178 (“. . . RFRA did not just restore the kind of
weak strict scrutiny that prevailed pre-Smith. It ushered in a regime that is more
protective of religious freedom . . . .”).
46
Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), quoted in Colombo, supra
note 43, at 40.
44
45
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RFRA’s constitutionality was eventually challenged, and the
legislation was upheld as applied to the federal government and
federal law, 47 but struck down as applied to state governments
and state laws. 48 This, in turn, prompted several states to pass
RFRAs of their own. 49 As of this writing, 20 states have passed
such laws, and most are closely modeled on the federal version. 50
When this development is added to the mix, we have a regime in
which religious liberty is robustly protected against federal
encroachment, but which enjoys no equivalent protection
uniformly at the state level.
Recall that even post-Smith, however, the Free Exercise
Clause continues to protect against the intentional
circumscription or regulation of religious belief or behavior on
account of its religious nature, 51 and as such state governments
are forbidden from engaging in anything of that sort to the same
extent as the federal government. But with regard to laws of
general applicability, the states are for the most part not
restrained by the Free Exercise Clause. 52 The only protections
that individuals have against state laws that substantially
burden their religious exercise would be those contained in their
state constitution or promulgated under state law, including the
aforementioned state RFRA statutes.
C. Corporate Assertions of Free Exercise Rights
In retrospect, corporate assertions of free exercise rights
were inevitable.
The rise of an increasingly aggressive
regulatory state, coupled with ever-greater religious diversity
among Americans, was bound to generate conflict between the

47
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 439 (2006).
48
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997).
49
See National Conference of State Legislatures: State Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfrastatutes.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
50
See id.
51
See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 34–35.
52
The language used here is qualified because of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of strict scrutiny in the face of “hybrid” cases and in situations where a
law recognizes various non-religiously based exemptions but no religiously based
exemptions. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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laws of the land and the religious scruples of some segments of
the population. 53
That these conflicts have bubbled over into the realm of
business enterprises should, likewise, not be surprising given the
nature of modern-day business regulation. As I have explained
elsewhere:
[B]usiness regulation over the past few decades has taken on a
more value-laden, and a less specifically economic character.
Whereas early twentieth-century business regulation focused on
issues such as minimum wage and child labor, late twentiethcentury business regulation has addressed issues of civil rights
and discrimination. As it opens, the twenty-first century has
continued along this trajectory, witnessing demands that
employers provide equal benefits to same-sex couples and that
employers offer health insurance plans that cover such things
as contraceptives, abortifacients, and sterilization. This serves
to increase conflict, as the values animating some of this
modern regulation and the values driving religiously inspired
businesses can diverge in ways that are less likely when dealing
with purely economic regulation. 54

More surprising than the mere assertion of corporate
religious liberty claims was the validation of such claims by the
Supreme Court in the 2014 case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. 55 Before delving into the substance of Burwell, however, it is
important to discuss why that case’s outcome should not have
been so wholly unanticipated.
At the risk of indulging in semantics, it ought to be
acknowledged that there really is nothing particularly novel or
controversial about “corporate religious liberty” per se.
Charitable organizations, religious institutions, and even
churches and congregations are frequently organized as nonprofit
corporations, but are corporations nonetheless. 56 That such
corporate entities have standing to assert religious liberty
claims—first under the Free Exercise Clause and, in more recent
times under RFRA—has been firmly established. 57
See Garnett, supra note 7, at 498.
See Colombo, supra note 43, at 25 (citations omitted).
55
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014).
56
See Bruce B. Jackson, Secularization by Incorporation: Religious
Organizations and Corporate Identity, 11 FIRST AMEND. L REV. 90, 95 (2012).
57
See Thad Eagles, Note, Free Exercise, Inc.: A New Framework for
Adjudicating Corporate Religious Liberty Claims, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 597–98
53
54
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Additionally, it has also been firmly established that
engagement in for-profit activity does not bar a claimant from
asserting his, her, or its religious liberty rights. In Braunfeld v.
Brown, the Supreme Court recognized the rightful assertion of
Free Exercise rights by a group of “merchants” who objected to
Sunday closing laws due to the effect that such laws had upon
their businesses. 58 Likewise, in United States v. Lee, the Court
acknowledged that a sole proprietor had standing to challenge
the social security tax levied upon his businesses, a farm and
carpentry shop, on Free Exercise grounds. 59 Although claimants
in these two cases ultimately did not prevail upon their Free
Exercise claims, their failure was on the merits. 60 In other
words, the Court did not challenge the propriety of claimants’
Free Exercise arguments, but rather accepted their propriety and
proceeded to review the challenged laws under the requisite
standards for adjudicating free exercise claims.
Thus in
Braunfeld, the merchants’ claims were unsuccessful because the
law in question did not substantially burden religious exercise
and could not be more narrowly tailored according to the Court:
But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law
within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance
the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish
its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden. 61

Similarly, in Lee, the Court grappled seriously with the
claimant’s assertion that the social security tax conflicted with
his Amish faith, but reiterated the rule that the state may
nevertheless “justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing
that it is essential to accomplish an overriding government
interest.” 62 In rendering its decision, the Court never questioned
(2015) (“The [Supreme] Court . . . held on multiple occasions that government action
violated the free exercise and RFRA rights of incorporated churches, and heard
challenges from incorporated churches that failed for other reasons. The corporate
form alone, therefore, could not prohibit religious liberty protection.”) (citations
omitted); see also Colombo, supra note 6, at 71.
58
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601, 606 (1961).
59
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254, 256 (1982).
60
See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608–09; see also Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–59.
61
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. As can be seen, some interpretive liberty was
taken in the presentation of the Court’s holding here, translating “indirect burden”
as “insubstantial burden” and “by means which do not impose such a burden” as
“narrowly tailored.” Id.
62
Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
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the appropriateness of applying the Free Exercise Clause to the
situation at hand, but rather ruled in favor of the government
“[b]ecause the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax
system is of such a high order.” 63
Although both Braunfeld and Lee were decided before the
Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
the cases remain good law. Recall that Smith expressly upheld
its existing First Amendment precedent, including the earlier
cases, Lee and Braunfeld. 64
As discussed, following Smith, it is RFRA, and not the First
Amendment, that provides the lion’s share of protection for
religious practices that are impeded by federal laws of general
applicability. 65 This has led some, including the Department of
Justice during the Obama Administration, to take the
implausible position that RFRA actually narrows the scope of
The position is
protected religious activity post-Smith. 66
implausible in light of RFRA’s language and legislative history,
recounted earlier. 67 Recall that RFRA was ostensibly passed to
“restore” the protections of religious liberty as many understood
them to be prior to the Smith decision. 68 The only serious debate
over RFRA’s effect is whether it truly restored the pre-Smith
state of affairs versus whether it actually bolstered the level of
protection afforded to religious exercise in America. 69 Although
discerning Congressional intent can oftentimes be difficult, here
the record is clear that RFRA was intended to reverse the
Employment Division v. Smith decision and to provide for or
restore a robust approach to free exercise rights. 70
RFRA’s very text similarly evinces a vigorous approach to
religious liberty, on par with the Act’s legislative intent. Critics
to corporate religious liberty argue that RFRA’s reference to a
“person’s exercise of religion” excludes its extension to for-profit

Id. at 260.
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990).
65
See supra Part I.B.
66
See Terri R. Day et al., A Primer on Hobby Lobby: For-Profit Corporate
Entities’ Challenge to the HHS Mandate, Free Exercise Rights, RFRA’s Scope, and
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 74 (2014).
67
See supra Part I.B.
68
See Greene, supra note 45 at 178.
69
Id.
70
See supra Part I.B.
63
64
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corporations. 71 As per the Dictionary Act, however, it is a matter
of fundamental statutory interpretation to interpret the word
“person” to “include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.” 72 This would appear to settle the matter, but for
the Dictionary Act’s admonishment that its definitions do not
apply if “the context indicates otherwise.” 73
As would be expected, the opponents of corporate free
exercise argue that RFRA’s context does not support defining its
reference to “person” to encompass for-profit corporations. 74 Both
proponents and opponents of corporate free exercise reference
Supreme Court precedent in support of their position. 75 This is
enabled by the fact that, (1) on the one hand, the Court had
permitted “merchants” and other for-profit actors to assert Free
Exercise Claims against laws impacting their commercial
activity, 76 while (2) on the other hand, the Court had never
expressly held that a for-profit corporation could assert such
claims. 77
Further muddying the jurisprudential waters, or, from
another perspective, tipping the balance, is the fact that there is
near “universal acceptance that RFRA’s use of the word ‘persons’
included nonprofit corporations.” 78 This could be interpreted as
suggesting the irrelevance of the corporate form to the question
of Free Exercise and RFRA religious rights. Put differently, the
Free Exercise Clause and, subsequently, RFRA covers all
individuals and entities engaged in religious exercise, whether
incorporated or unincorporated.

See Day, supra note 66, at 73–74.
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
73
Id.
74
See John Duke, Religious Freedom and the Little Corporation That Could:
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 34 MISS. C. L. REV. 89, 95 (2015).
75
See Maria Iliadis, An Easy Pill to Swallow, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 341, 354
(2015); Marc A. Greendorfer, Blurring the Lines Between Churches and Secular
Corporations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 855 (2015).
76
See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
77
See Seema Mohapatra, Time to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care
Coverage: Using Corporate Law to Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 137, 149 (2015).
78
See Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 193, 196 (2015).
71
72
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Conversely, the Court’s past recognition of the Free Exercise
Clause’s applicability to nonprofit corporations could be read as
underscoring the exclusion of for-profit corporations from the
Clause’s umbrella of protection. This argument borrows from the
logic of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius—the time-honored
maxim that the explicit inclusion of one thing should be
interpreted as intending the exclusion of another. 79 In other
words, by extending the Free Exercise Clause’s protections to
nonprofit corporations, and only to nonprofit corporations, the
Supreme Court had arguably drawn a line in the sand
distinguishing nonprofit corporations from other corporate
entities. Consequently, this is purportedly the precedent that
RFRA intended to restore. A fortiori, RFRA’s reference to
“persons” does not go beyond the list of entities previously
recognized by the Supreme Court as entitled to assert Free
Exercise claims.
Inclusio unius, however, is a poor fit for this situation. The
maxim applies to the interpretation of contracts 80 and statutes, 81
not to Supreme Court opinions. 82 And for good reason. Unlike
the drafter of a contract or piece of legislation, Supreme Court
justices are limited by the parties and issues before the Court.
Thus, a fairer interpretation of the Court’s traditional silence on
the issue of for-profit corporations and the Free Exercise Clause
would be to simply observe that, heretofore, the Court had not
been given an opportunity to squarely address the issue. The
Supreme Court explicitly disclaimed any resolution of the abovereferenced controversies in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, proffering a

79
See Eric Engle, Legal Interpretation by Computer: A Survey of Interpretive
Rules, 5 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 77 (2011).
80
See Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L.
REV. 765, 786 (2000).
81
See Patrick O’Leary, Moreau v. Harris County: The Fifth Circuit Determines
That the Fair Labor Standards Act Does Not Prohibit Public Employers From
Mandating the Use of Accrued Compensatory Time, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2171, 2176
(1999).
82
Cf. Jerry Buchmeyer, Louisiana Law – Legends and Laughs, 67 TEX. B. J.
815, 816 (2004) (“A case was being argued to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel
that included the legendary John Minor Wisdom. Judge Wisdom asked counsel, a
well-known lawyer from Midland, ‘Counsel, are you familiar with the maxim
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius?’ Without hesitation, counsel responded
sanctimoniously, ‘Your Honor, in Midland they speak of little else.’ ”).
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decision that was intentionally narrower in scope. Upon closer
inspection, however, the Burwell decision is not as limited as it
might superficially appear to be.
In Burwell, the Supreme Court consolidated two cases
challenging certain regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services following passage of the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). 83 The regulations in question were
those pertaining to the ACA’s “contraceptive mandate,” pursuant
to which “specified employees’ group health plans . . . [were]
required to provide coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods
approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including the 4
that may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg
from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the
uterus.” 84 Claimants considered it immoral, and contrary to their
religious beliefs, to facilitate the intentional destruction of a
human embryo by providing all of the federally mandated
insurance coverage. 85 In greater detail, claimants contended that
obedience to the contraceptive mandate would make them
complicit in a grave moral evil. 86 Asserting, therefore, that the
contraceptive mandate “imposes a substantial burden” on their
ability to “conduct business in accordance with their religious
beliefs,” 87 the claimants sought an exemption therefrom under
either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. 88
The two cases coming before the Supreme Court also gave
rise to a circuit split: In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Burwell, the Third Circuit denied claimant’s request for a
religious liberty exemption, 89 whereas in Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit granted it. 90 In so doing, the
Third Circuit held that a for-profit, secular corporation could

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Id. at 2754.
85
See id. at 2778.
86
See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2516 (2015).
87
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (emphasis omitted).
88
See id. at 2755.
89
See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 724 F.3d 377, 417 (3d Cir.
2013) (reversed sub nom. Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751).
90
See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1191 (10th Cir. 2013)
(en banc).
83
84
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assert neither a Free Exercise Clause nor a RFRA claim, 91
whereas the Tenth Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could
assert both a Free Exercise Clause and a RFRA claim. 92
The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the claimants,
granting them the exemption sought, thereby reversing the Third
Circuit’s holding and affirming the Tenth Circuit’s. 93 But
whereas the circuit courts ruled upon the Free Exercise and
RFRA claims in concert, the Supreme Court did not. The
Supreme Court explicitly ruled only upon claimants’ RFRA
claims, and passed on deciding upon the Free Exercise Clause’s
applicability. 94 In its own words:
The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held
corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory
question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment
claim raised by [claimants]. 95

In order to determine whether RFRA’s reference to “person”
included for-profit corporations, the Court turned to the
Dictionary Act. 96 As discussed, the Dictionary Act explicitly
includes for-profit corporations in its definition of “person,” and
as such the only issue is whether the context of the legislation
under examination requires an alternative interpretation of the
term. 97 Thus, the Dictionary Act required the Court to assess
RFRA’s context for evidence of a definition of “person” that would
exclude business corporations.
In its assessment of RFRA, the Court made two interrelated
observations. First, the Court noted that RFRA should not be
read as “merely restor[ing] this Court’s pre-Smith decisions in
ossified form.” 98 The Court explained that the results would be
“absurd” if RFRA were to be read as “not allow[ing] a plaintiff to
raise a RFRA claim unless that plaintiff fell within a category of
plaintiffs one of whom had brought a free-exercise claim that this
Court entertained in the years before Smith.” 99

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 388.
See Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 723 F.3d at 1135–37.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
See id. at 2785.
Id.
See id. at 2768.
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773.
Id.
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Second, the Court observed that “Congress enacted RFRA in
1993 to provide very broad protection for religious liberty”—even
more protection than that which existed prior to Smith. 100 For
whereas, according to the Court, a “balancing test” was applied to
Free Exercise challenges to laws of general applicability preSmith, RFRA replaced that test with the much more stringent
“least restrictive means” standard. 101
Taken together, these observations led the Court to conclude
that “nothing in RFRA . . . suggests a congressional intent to
depart from the Dictionary Act definition.” 102 As such, the
Court’s majority in Burwell held that RFRA’s protections
embraced for-profit corporate claimants. 103
Although Burwell answered the question of corporate
religious liberty rights with respect to RFRA (in the affirmative),
it left unanswered the question with respect to the First
Amendment. By bifurcating the RFRA and Free Exercise Clause
analysis, and by eschewing any explicit holding on the latter, the
Court failed to provide a clear articulation of the Free Exercise
Clause’s reach.
Temporarily, at least, this is not particularly problematic.
As indicated previously, when it comes to religious liberty claims
against federal action, RFRA, and not the First Amendment,
does the heavy lifting post-Smith. 104 Nevertheless, to the extent
that the Free Exercise Clause itself might be implicated in a
corporate religious liberty dispute, the First Amendment
implications of Burwell should not go unnoticed. 105 For although

Id. at 2760.
Id. at 2760−61. The Court’s reference to its pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence as having employed a “balancing test” apparently recognizes
something that commentators have noted: The Court’s purported application of
“strict scrutiny” toward government action infringing religious liberty was strict in
name only. See Greene, supra note 45, at 163, 177.
102
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
103
See id. at 2785.
104
See supra text accompanying note 65.
105
Although RFRA is inapplicable to state law and state governments, the Free
Exercise Clause is not so restricted. As such, state action that would run afoul the
narrow protections of the Free Exercise Clause—as understood post-Smith—could
still potentially be challenged by a business corporation. Whether the corporation
would be able to press ahead with its challenge would turn, in part, upon our
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause’s reach.
100
101
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Burwell ostensibly left the question of the Free Exercise Clause’s
applicability to for-profit business corporations unresolved, it
nevertheless provided some rather clear guidance.
As mentioned, in its assessment of RFRA’s context, the
Court found no justification for deviating from the Dictionary
Act’s definition of “person.” 106 This conclusion was made easy by
the dual observations that (1) RFRA should not be read as
restoring religious liberty precedent pre-Smith in an “ossified”
form and, moreover, (2) RFRA superimposed a regime of religious
liberty even more robust than that which existed prior to
Smith. 107 A fair amount can be gleaned from this.
Particularly telling is the Court’s comment and discussion
about an “ossified” Free Exercise jurisprudence. 108 Here the
Court makes clear that the “category of plaintiffs” which had
previously been recognized as potential Free Exercise Clause
claimants is not fixed to those recognized prior to Smith, but
remains subject to further expansion. 109 Thus, the failure of
having previously recognized a for-profit corporate Free Exercise
claimant should not preclude the recognition of one in the future.
That possibility remains open.
Further, in the Court’s review of its precedent, Justice Alito
makes the same observations made previously here and
elsewhere: the Supreme Court has long recognized the Free
Exercise Clause’s applicability to unincorporated for-profit
businesses, along with its applicability to nonprofit
corporations. 110 All of this strongly suggests that, although
decided as a matter of statutory, namely, RFRA, rather than
constitutional interpretation, Burwell reflects a belief on the part
of the Court that the Free Exercise Clause does indeed
encompass for-profit corporate claimants.
With regard to the point that RFRA superimposed a more
robust regime of religious liberty than that which had existed
prior to Smith, 111 this does not, upon close inspection, affect our
analysis of for-profit, corporate Free Exercise standing. For a
careful reading of RFRA’s text and history reveals that its
106
107
108
109
110
111

See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text.
Id.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773.
See id.
See id. at 2769−2773.
See id. at 2760.
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robustness goes to the strength of its religious liberty protections,
not the scope of those protections. The backlash sparked by
Smith was centered entirely on the Supreme Court’s use of the
“rational basis test” for laws of general applicability in place of
the “compelling government interest” or “least restrictive means”
tests. 112 It was not over any question pertaining to who can
rightfully claim the protections of the Free Exercise Clause.
Thus, Burwell should not be read as extending religious liberty
protections to for-profit corporations only because of RFRA’s
enactment. Rather, Burwell is best read as reflecting the Court’s
view that (1) the “free exercise of religion,” as that term is
understood under RFRA and, apparently, the First Amendment
as well, can encompass the conduct of for-profit corporations, and
(2) the test to be applied to the alleged infringement of the free
exercise of religion by federal laws of general applicability is the
compelling government interest or least restrictive means test as
set forth in RFRA.
Finally, it should be noted that in Burwell the Court
indicated a concern over third-party harms flowing from the
requested accommodation. 113 For although the Court ruled in
favor of granting an accommodation, it arguably did so only after
assuring itself that the effect of the accommodation on third
parties “would be precisely zero.” 114 And this should not be
surprising, as “[t]he analysis of free exercise claims has always
taken harm to third parties into account.” 115 A perennial,
unanswered question has been, however, “what counts as
harm”? 116 Unfortunately, the Court in Burwell did not shed
much light on this issue, as it did “not examine the kinds of harm
that accommodation of complicity-based conscience claims might
inflict,” nor did the Court “offer guidance about how principles
concerned with third-party harm might apply in future cases.” 117
As we shall see, among other things, employing an antitrust

See Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206.
See Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2531.
114
Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760). See also id. at 2580 (“ ‘courts
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose
on nonbeneficiaries’ ”) (quoting 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37).
115
See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom? 123 YALE L.J.
770, 803 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).
116
Id.
117
Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2532.
112
113
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approach to corporate free exercise exemptions
accommodations would help address these concerns. 118

51

and

II. U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
This article contends that concepts borrowed from U.S.
antitrust law can be used to help navigate the turbulent waters
of for-profit free-exercise rights. More specifically, this Article
suggests that antitrust’s focus on market power holds the key to
best reconciling the conflicting rights of third parties and
religiously expressive for-profit business actors. After briefly
setting forth some general background information on U.S.
antitrust law, this part will examine the concept of market
power.
A.

Background

Known as “competition law” in most of the world, 119 U.S.
federal antitrust law was brought into being by the Sherman Act
in 1890. 120 Before that time, in the United States antitrust law
was—like most other fields of law—a matter left to the states. 121
At the state level, its precepts and prohibitions were largely
derived from common law rules regarding restraint of trade. 122
By the late Nineteenth Century, however, it had become
clear that the “trusts” 123 were beyond the ability of individual
states to regulate. 124 Hence Congress’s intervention in 1890.
118
Although many courts and commentators have used the terms
interchangeably, best practice is to use “exemptions” to refer to judicially crafted
relief from laws of general applicability on the basis of religious objection and
“accommodations” to refer to relief that is legislatively crafted.
119
E.g., David J. Gerber, Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust Law, 14
CONN. J. INT’L L. 15, 16–23 (1999).
120
See Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of
Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 667–69 (1993).
121
See id. at 658.
122
See id.
123
“Trust,” within this context, is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as: “An
association or organization of persons or corporations having the intention and
power, or the tendency, to create a monopoly, control production, interfere with the
free course of trade or transportation, or to fix and regulate the supply and price of
commodities.” Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
124
See Gavil, supra note 120, at 658 (“With the ability to structure and
restructure their conduct around states whose laws and law enforcers proved hostile,
the trusts could evade attempts at condemnation and remedial restructuring with
relative ease at the state level.”).
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Although the precise contours of the Congressional intent
undergirding the Act’s passage remain a subject of debate, 125
broad agreement has been reached over a number of essential
items. As one commentator explained after surveying Supreme
Court antitrust precedent:
Controversies continue to rage after more than a century of
Sherman Act enforcement, but one thing should be settled: “the
policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.” With
the Sherman Act, Congress “sought to establish a regime of
competition as the fundamental principle governing commerce
in this country.”
The statutory scheme is to “safeguard
consumers by protecting the competitive process.”
“The
Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better
goods and services,” and the Act “precludes inquiry into the
question whether competition is good or bad” in particular
circumstances. 126

One of the hallmarks of U.S. antitrust law, and particularly
the Sherman Act, is its reliance on the judiciary for an
articulation of its details. Indeed, it is not hyperbole to say that
Congress entrusted to the judiciary a significant role in the
setting of antitrust policy itself. 127 Both Section 1 and Section 2
of the Act, which contain its laboring oars, read as follows in
their current manifestations:
Sherman Act, Section 1
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court. 128
125
See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 941, 947–49 (2014).
126
See Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act,
9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87, 87 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
127
See David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 MO. L.
REV. 725, 740 (2001); Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L.
REV. 1677, 1678−80 (1995).
128
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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Sherman Act, Section 2
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 129

Congress left it to the courts to define the critical terms
“restraint of trade” and “monopolize” as used in Sections 1 and 2
of the Act, 130 thereby inviting an evolving, judicially crafted
approach to federal antitrust law. Accepting the invitation, the
courts adopted an approach pursuant to which the Sherman Act
was essentially deemed to prohibit “unreasonable” business
practices—unreasonable restraints of trade under Section 1, and
unreasonably exclusionary conduct under Section 2. 131
That said, Congress did not completely depend upon the
judiciary to effectuate its vision of antitrust policy, 132 especially
after the Supreme Court’s 1911 decisions in Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States and United States v. American
Tobacco Co. 133 Members of Congress were of the opinion that the
Sherman Act needed to be strengthened in light of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of it in those two landmark cases. 134 This
ultimately led to the passage of the Clayton Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act in 1914. 135 Although the legislative
histories of these acts are “lengthy, complex, and at time
cacophonous,” it can confidently be said that these acts sought to
strengthen the Sherman Act by providing clearer protections for

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antirust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051, 1060 (1979).
131
See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52
B.C. L. REV. 871, 875−76 (2011).
132
See Thomas J. Horton, Fixing Merger Litigation “Fixes”: Reforming the
Litigation of Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D.
L. REV. 165, 187 (2010).
133
See id.
134
See id.
135
See id. at 189.
129
130
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consumers and small firms against the “unfair use” of monopoly
power. 136 Of most relevance to our inquiry is section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which reads in full as follows:
F.T.C. Act, Section 5
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful. 137

The most critical feature of the FTC Act is its creation of the
Federal Trade Commission, a new federal agency empowered
with authority to “administer” federal antitrust law. 138 The
operative language of Section 5, set forth above, has, over time,
“been held coterminous with the Sherman and Clayton Acts.” 139
As Richard Posner has explained:
It used to be thought that “unfair methods of competition” swept
further than the practices forbidden by the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, and you find this point repeated occasionally even
today, but it is no longer tenable. The Sherman and Clayton
Acts have been interpreted so broadly that they no longer
contain gaps that a broad interpretation of Section 5 of the FTC
Act might be needed to fill. There are business torts, such as
disparagement and trademark infringement, that do not rise to
the level of antitrust violations yet distort competition and are
“unfair” (indeed trademark law is often referred to as “unfair
competition” law), but I have not heard it suggested that the
existing remedies for these practices are inadequate. 140

Whereas the Sherman Act already effectively prohibited
unfair methods of competition—using its bar on unreasonable
conduct—the Sherman Act “does not become effective until a

Id. at 187.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
138
See Horton, supra note 132, at 188; see also F.M. Scherer, Sunlight and
Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 467 (1990)
(identifying as “the most important” feature of the FTC Act as the creation of an
agency with “the power of preventing in their conception and in their beginning
some of [the] unfair processes in competition which have been the chief courses of
monopoly”) (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 14,941 (1914)).
139
WILLIAM HOLMES AND MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK
§ 7:2 (2015).
140
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 766 (2005). But see Thomas Dahdouh, Section 5, the FTC and
its Critics: Just Who Are the Radicals Here?, 20 No. 2 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. &
UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1, 7 (2011).
136
137
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monopoly is full grown.” 141 By contrast, Section 5 of the FTC Act,
coupled with the creation of the FTC, “ ‘is aimed to nip those
practices in the bud’ in order to protect competitors from unfair
methods of competition before a monopoly has been achieved or is
dangerously close to being achieved.” 142
B. The Tensions of Antitrust
As explained by Philip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkemp:
the principle objective of antitrust policy is to maximize
consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively
while yet permitting them to take advantage of every available
economy that comes from . . . efficiencies. 143

This apparently straight-forward objective is fraught with
significant tensions and difficulties. First, is competition and the
maximization of consumer welfare best measured by the total
number of marketplace participants (competitors), or rather by
efficiencies of scale achieved via size, integration, and/or interfirm cooperation? 144 And, in our efforts to protect competition,
ought the law protect competitors from one another? 145 With
regard to this latter point, the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe
explicitly recognized the tension and difficulties involved:
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But
we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must
give effect to that decision. 146

William Kolasky, George Rublee and the Origins of the Federal Trade
Commission, 26 ANTITRUST 106, 109 (2011) (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914)).
142
Id. (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914)).
143
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 100a, 4 (3d
ed. 2006).
144
See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 814−15 (2004).
145
See id.
146
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), quoted in Dibadj,
supra note 144, at 816.
141
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Indeed, since the Sherman Act’s passage, the Supreme Court
has identified a number of goals undergirding U.S. antitrust law,
not all of which appear consistent with one another. 147 Over the
years, the Court has described Congress’s intent behind the
Sherman Act in various ways, some of which could be viewed as
in tension with others:
•

to prevent the concentration of markets through acquisitions,
and “perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units
which can effectively compete with each other”;

•

to protect firms’ “right of freedom to trade”;

•

to promote consumer welfare, allocative efficiency, and price
competition;

•

to “protect the public from the failure of the market”;

•

to preserve economic freedom and the freedom for each
business “to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination,
devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster”;

•

to condemn practices that “completely shut[] out competitors,
not only from trade in which they are already engaged, but
from the opportunities to build up trade in any community
where these great and powerful combinations are operating
under this system and practice”;

•

to “secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public
against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition
through monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade”;
and

•

to “be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade.” 148

147
See Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551,
560−62 (2012).
148
Id. (quoting various Supreme Court precedents) (citations omitted). See also
id. at 559−60 (quoting RICHARD HOFSTRADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust
Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188,
199−200 (Vintage 2008)) (reading three sets of goals into the overall objective of
antitrust law: “(1) economic (competition maximizes “economic efficiency”),
(2) political (antitrust principles ‘intended to block private accumulations of power
and protect democratic government’), and (3) social and moral (competitive process
was ‘disciplinary machinery’ for character development)”).
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Tremendous debate continues to rage over how best to
define, effectuate, and navigate antitrust law’s thorny mission,
and, predictably, different sides in the debate are championed by
different schools of economic and social thought. 149 Even within
the federal government, the two agencies entrusted with
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice, have not always
agreed upon the best paths to take. 150
Perhaps inevitably, therefore, outside of certain conduct
circumscribed as per se unlawful, 151 the Supreme Court’s modern
approach to antitrust cases typically reflects a careful balancing
of interests. 152 Indeed, this has been so pronounced that some
have criticized the Court’s approach as “ad hoc,” to the detriment
of establishing of a “coherent antitrust jurisprudence.” 153
C. The Rule of Reason
Arguably, nothing characterizes the judiciary’s careful,
balancing approach to its antitrust jurisprudence more than “the
rule of reason.” As explained by the Supreme Court in 1911 in
construing the Sherman Act:
Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and
requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the
standard of reason which had been applied at the common law
and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used
for the purpose of determining whether, in a given case, a
particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against
which the statute provided. 154

149
See generally Eliot G. Disner, Antitrust Law: The Chicago School Meets the
Real World, 25 L.A. LAW. 14, 14 (2002); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust:
Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191,
1191 (1977).
150
See Kelly Everett, Trust Issues: Will President Barack Obama Reconcile the
Tenuous Relationship Between Antitrust Enforcement Agencies?, 29 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 727, 747–49 (2009).
151
See infra text accompanying notes 158–160.
152
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 143, ¶305d at 72; See E. Thomas Sullivan,
The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First
Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 55–56 (1982).
153
Sullivan, supra note 152, at 56.
154
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (emphasis
added).
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In subsequent cases, the Court would flesh out what exactly
this “standard of reason” consisted of. 155 Its first full articulation
was set forth by Justice Brandeis seven years later in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States156 as follows:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be
determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains
competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their
very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences. 157

Critically, the “Rule of Reason” demands a case-by-case, factbased, contextual inquiry regarding the conduct at issue to
determine whether it violates the Sherman Act’s prohibition on
“unreasonable” restraints of trade. 158 This careful, arduous
approach is necessary given the particularly challenging
balancing act entrusted to antitrust law.
Over time, however, with increased experience in applying
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has become comfortable
with promulgating certain “per se” rules as exceptions to the Rule
Pursuant to this development, certain
of Reason. 159
undertakings are deemed always violative of the Sherman Act,
regardless of their circumstances, because of their inherently

155
See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW.
435, 440 (2012).
156
See generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 231
(1918).
157
Id. at 238, quoted in Cavanagh, supra note 155, at 441.
158
See Cavanagh, supra note 155, at 440, 443–44.
159
See id. at 443–44.
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“predictable and . . . anticompetitive” nature. 160
Conduct
identified as constituting per se violations of the Sherman Act
includes price fixing among competitors, group boycotts, and
tying arrangements. 161
D. Market Power
As indicated, an alleged restraint of trade that is not
circumscribed as a per se violation of the Sherman Act is
analyzed under the Rule of Reason. 162 In conducting this
analysis, “[o]ne of the most important factors . . . is whether the
defendant possesses ‘market power’ in the ‘relevant market’
where the alleged conduct occurred.” 163 Indeed, market power is
so important that commentators routinely refer to it as “the focal
point of antitrust law.” 164
Initially, antitrust law viewed market power as synonymous
with “bigness”—a firm’s absolute size as measured by assets,
sales, or employees. 165 Over time, this perspective gave way to
the concept of “relative size”: a firm’s “share of the industry in
which it operates.” 166 Judge Easterbrook provides us with the
current, most evolved definition of market power, and explains
its significance too, as follows:

160
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997), quoted in Cavanagh, supra note
155, at 444 n.82.
161
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Commentary, Per Se Violations in Antitrust
Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 166 (1988).
162
See supra notes 158–161.
163
Benjamin J. Larson, Antitrust For All: A Primer for the Non-Antitrust
Practitioner, 43 COLO. LAW. 19, 20 (Oct. 2014).
164
Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The
Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a
Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336, 339 (1993); see also AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶104b at 85–86 (“Gradually the ‘rule of reason’ used
to determine whether to enforce contracts in restraint of trade came to focus on the
defendants’ position in the market.”). But see Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power
Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) (“The requirement that an antitrust plaintiff show market
power in rule of reason cases has an uninspiring history and unconvincing
justifications. Such a requirement has never been adopted by the Supreme Court,
and is currently imposed by only the Seventh and Forth Circuits.”).
165
See Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 607, 633 (2012).
166
Id. at 607–08.
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Market power is the ability to raise price significantly without
losing so many sales that the increase is unprofitable. Most
firms have a little power, because their products are not
perfectly interchangeable with the goods of others. But few
firms have substantial power over price. Firms that lack power
cannot injure competition no matter how hard they try. They
may injure a few consumers, or a few rivals, or
themselves . . . by selecting “anticompetitive” tactics. When the
firms lack market power, though, they cannot persist in
deleterious practices. Rival firms will offer the consumers
better deals. Rivals’ better offers will stamp out bad practices
faster than the judicial process can. For these and other
reasons many lower courts have held that proof of market power
is an indispensable first step in any case under the Rule of
Reason. The Supreme Court has established a market power
hurdle in tying cases, despite the nominally per se character of
the tying offense, on the same ground offered here: if the
defendant lacks market power, other firms can offer the
customer a better deal, and there is no need for judicial
intervention. 167

Easterbrook’s definition of market power, “the ability to raise
price significantly without losing so many sales that the increase
is unprofitable,” 168 enjoys the familiar benefits of his economic
expertise. And it is indeed the standard definition of market
But a simpler approach has
power used in antitrust. 169
traditionally been employed: that of equating market power with
market share. 170 Generally, the traditional approach works fine,
for a firm with a very large market share typically enjoys
tremendous market power. 171 However, certain factors can
indeed complicate matters, such that “[h]igh market share may
overstate true market power, while low market share may
Fortunately, for our purposes, the
understate state it.” 172
exacting precision of an economist such as Judge Easterbook is
not necessary. What is essential is recognition of the fact that
certain firms do in fact possess market power while other firms
do not. Those firms that do can be generally identified by the
predominance of their market share, and/or their ability to
167
168
169
170
171
172

Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984).
Id.
Orbach & Rebling, supra note 165, at 636.
See Jacobs, supra note 164, at 341–42.
See id. at 343.
Id. at 342.
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impose their will upon the marketplace. Or, as the Supreme
Court put it, a firm with market power has “the power ‘to force a
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive
market.’ ” 173 Indeed, the Court’s definition enjoys a facet of
additional accuracy in that control over price need not be the
focus of the antitrust inquiry, as “price could be substituted for
output, product quality, product variety, or other product
dimensions.” 174
Power cannot exist in a vacuum. Consequently, a critical
component of the market power analysis is establishing the
“relevant product and geographic market.” 175 In other words,
over what products does a firm in question exercise power, and
where? The only seller of light bulbs in a small, remote Alaskan
town may very well have tremendous market power in that town
over light bulbs, but will have no power to effect consumers in
Seattle, Tokyo, or Vienna.
Economists utilize the concept of “elasticity” to help define
the relevant product market for antitrust purposes. 176 High
elasticity in the demand of a product indicates the willingness of
consumers to forgo its purchase in preference to a substitute
should the product’s price rise significantly. 177 Low elasticity,
conversely, suggests the opposite: the willingness of consumers to
pay significantly higher prices for a given product rather than
abandoning it for a substitute. 178
With regard to elasticity, it should be acknowledged that for
many products there exists a core group of consumers with very
strong preferences for those particular products. Preferences so
strong that even a significant increase in a particular product’s

173
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992)
(quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)), quoted in
Matt Koehler, Comment, The Importance of Correctly Identifying the Consumer for
an Antitrust Relevant Market Analysis, 67 UMKC L. REV. 521, 525 (1999).
174
Orbach & Rebling, supra note 165, at 636. It should be noted that as with so
much of antitrust, even the definition of market power is heavily laden with policy
considerations, such that a leading antitrust treatise observed: “How much market
power is excessive enough to warrant intervention under the antitrust laws is
largely a question of legal policy, not economic fact.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 143, ¶ 502, at 112.
175
See Koehler, supra note 173.
176
See id. at 525–26.
177
See id. at 533–34.
178
See id.
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price will not affect this core group’s purchasing patterns. 179
Most courts will not consider this to be evidence of price
inelasticity. 180 Rather, “[m]ost courts implicitly insist that a
market be ‘substantial’ in scope by ignoring smaller ones.” 181
For geographic markets, the definition employed is “the
geographic area to which consumers can practically turn for
alternative sources of the product and in which [the firm] face[s]
competition.” 182 Put differently, “where else can the customer go”
for the product in question—and would a reasonable customer go
there. 183
As with market power itself, the intricacies of market
definition are not essential for the purposes of this article. What
is necessary is simple comprehension of the fact that market
power must be understood as a contextualized phenomenon: it
exists in a defined area and over a defined good or service.
As Judge Easterbrook explains further in the excerpt
provided above, a firm’s market power matters because it is only
through market power that a firm can inflict competitive harm. 184
This is why a “firm with market power is held to a higher
standard of business conduct than one without it.” 185 A firm with
little or no market power is unlikely to harm anyone. Should it
raise its prices to supracompetitive levels, or fail to stock items
that are in demand, its customers—and potential customers—
would ordinarily have ready recourse to the firm’s competitors.
Consider, on the other hand, a firm wielding market power, such
as the archetypical example of a monopolist. Such a firm can
dictate, to a very large degree, the prices that will be charged for
certain goods along with the goods’ availability in a given
market. Only at tremendous inconvenience could the firm’s
customers shop elsewhere; they are essentially beholden to the
firm’s prices, products, and policies.
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶ 530e, at 241.
See id.
181
Id.
182
Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994), quoted in
Koehler, supra note 173, at 529.
183
Koehler, supra note 173, at 532. This is another oversimplification, as
“[c]ustomer convenience and preference can narrow the geographic scope of a market
even in the absence of substantial transportation costs.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 143, ¶ 553, at 360.
184
See Easterbrook, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
185
See Jacobs, supra note 164.
179
180
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Antitrust’s focus on harm to consumers and competition led
one leading treatise’s author to note: “Antitrust is best served if
it . . . ignore[s] intent and focus[es] on conduct, market structure,
or other objective considerations.” 186
E. Reasonable versus Unreasonable Competition
In its efforts to protect consumers and competition from
harm, one of the tasks incumbent upon antitrust law is that of
distinguishing between “reasonable” versus “unreasonable”
competition—or, within the context of the FTC Act—between
“fair” versus “unfair” competition. 187 This difficult tight-rope act
puts on clearest display the usefulness of antitrust law’s recourse
to market power in its assessment of harm and violations of the
law.
The Supreme Court addressed this difficulty in Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan. 188 For the purpose of U.S. antitrust
law “is not to protect business from the working of the market; it
is to protect the public from the failure of the market.” 189 The
Court elaborated:
The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive,
even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to
destroy competition itself . . . . Thus, this Court and other
courts have been careful to avoid constructions of [the Sherman
Act] which might chill competition, rather than foster it. It is
sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from
conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects . . . . 190

This difficulty is compounded by the fact that even the phrase
“unfair methods of competition,” appearing in section 5 of the
Federal Trade Act was left undefined by Congress. 191

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶ 113, at 144.
The difference between assessing whether conduct is “reasonable” versus
“unreasonable” on the one hand and assessing whether conduct is “fair” versus
“unfair” on the other, although interesting, need not detain us here. For our
purposes, given that our focus is on general antitrust principles—and not careful,
specific applications of antitrust law in the context of antitrust problems—this
difference is not material.
188
See generally Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993).
189
Id. at 458.
190
Id. at 458–59; see also Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623
F.2d 1255, 1267 (8th Cir. 1980).
191
FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
186
187
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Not surprisingly, a fierce debate persists over what, exactly,
terms such as “fair” and “unfair,” “reasonable” and
“unreasonable” refer to. 192 Some read these terms in their
ordinary sense, as conveying a sense of moral rectitude or
indecency. 193 Others read these terms through economic lenses,
as shorthand for conduct injurious to “consumers’ welfare and
allocative efficiency.” 194
From this language’s inception, however, it was understood
that “whether competition is fair or unfair depends in a peculiar
degree upon the circumstances of the particular case.” 195 This, in
turn, apparently contributed to the language’s ambiguity and the
lack of a precise articulation of offensive—that is, “unfair” or
“unreasonable”—practices, for “it would be impossible through
legislation to define the many ways in which a large company
might engage in unfair competition without at the same time
strait-jacketing other, smaller businesses that might use the very
same methods to compete against those larger firms.” 196
A critical factor in distinguishing conduct that is “fair” or
“reasonable” versus that which is deemed “unfair” or
“unreasonable”—and, consequently, violative of federal antitrust
As discussed
law—is the market power of the actor. 197
previously, a firm without market power simply cannot or is
highly unlikely to inflict harm upon consumers or competition as
could a firm with market power. 198 Consequently, for all
practical purposes, the possession of market power has been
baked into the very definition of what constitutes unfair or
unreasonable competition. As a result, “it has been accepted in
antitrust law that ‘Davids can engage in many kinds of conduct
in the marketplace that are forbidden to Goliaths.’ ” 199
192
See Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 823, 827–51 (2013); Lambert, supra note 131, at
875.
193
See Horton, supra note 192, at 835–51.
194
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 567 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
195
See Kolasky, supra note 141, 108 (quoting Editorial, The Judiciary
Committee’s Blunder, 59 HARPER’S WKLY, 121, Aug. 8, 1914).
196
Id.
197
See Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1267 (8th
Cir. 1980); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 556 (7th Cir. 1980).
198
See supra Part II.D.
199
Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1267 (quoting Purex Corp. v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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An example of how this has played out is furnished by the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in FTC v. Texaco. 200 At issue in
FTC v. Texaco was, among other things, whether respondent
Texaco’s practice of inducing its service station dealers “to
purchase Goodrich tires, batteries, and accessories . . . in return
for a commission paid by Goodrich to Texaco[]” constituted
“ . . . an unfair method of competition.” 201 In finding a violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Court made a point to observe that
“Texaco holds dominant economic power over its dealers . . . ,” a
finding of fact that no party to the case disputed. 202 As the Court
explained, “[i]t is against the background of this dominant
economic power . . . that the sales-commission arrangement must
be viewed.” 203 Although not stated explicitly, it is rather clear
from the opinion that had Texaco not enjoyed such economic
dominance over its service station dealers there probably would
not have been a violation of Section 5 in that case.
In CBS v. FTC, the Seventh Circuit was even clearer than
the Supreme Court in underscoring the importance of market
power in assessing the unfairness of conduct in question. 204 At
issue in CBS v. FTC was the licensing practice of CBS’s
subsidiary, Columbia Record Club (“Columbia”). 205 Columbia
sold phonographic records by mail via catalog, and would include
the offerings of small record company manufacturers only if those
companies agreed not to sell any of their records to another
record club. 206 The FTC asserted that this practice constituted
an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act. 207
In assessing the FTC’s case against CBS, the Seventh
Circuit explained the importance of determining, as a threshold
matter, Columbia’s market power. 208 “To determine whether the
exclusive licensing provision is an unfair method of competition
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,” the Court
wrote, “the relevant market within which to measure the effect
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

See generally 393 U.S. 223, 223 (1968).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
See generally 414 F.2d 974, 974 (1969).
See id. at 976.
See id.
See id at 975.
See id. at 978.
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on competition must be defined.” 209 Having defined the relevant
market as “the record club market,” the Court then proceeded to
examine the market’s structure. 210 This is essential because
dominance over a market that is fluid, or that lacks significant
barriers to entry, gives merely the illusion of market power. 211
Given changes in the record industry between the time that the
FTC filed its complaint against CBS in 1962 and the date of the
FTC’s opinion in 1967, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
additional hearings were necessary and as such remanded the
case. 212 Thus, whether or not Columbia’s conduct was deemed
“unfair” in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act turned, in large
part, upon Columbia’s market power. Put differently, the
conduct itself could not be considered unfair absent an inquiry
into Columbia’s market power. 213
III. APPLICATION OF MARKET POWER CONSIDERATIONS TO
CORPORATE ASSERTIONS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
The proper scope of religious liberty exemptions remains a
hotly debated, divisive issue. In 2015, the drama played out in
Indiana, when a proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act in
that state touched off a firestorm of controversy. 214 The drama
repeated itself in 2016, in Georgia and Mississippi, when similar
bills passed the legislatures of those states. 215 In each situation,
Id.
See id. at 981.
211
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 143, ¶ 500, at 89–90.
212
See CBS, 414 F.2d at 981–82.
213
It should be noted that reference to market power is not a unique
characteristic of U.S. federal antitrust law, but can be seen in the antitrust law of
other nations as well. E.g., GABRIEL MOENS ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 199-200, § 6.105-6.110 (2010) (discussing “abuse of a dominant
position” under European Union law). It must also be remembered, however, that
despite its critical relevance to antitrust analysis, the possession of market power
per se, without more, does not constitute a violation of U.S. antitrust law. See Pac.
Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Comm., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447–48 (2009).
214
See Tony Cook and Brian Eason, Gov. Mike Pence signs RFRA fix, INDYSTAR
(April 2, 2015, 8:08 PM EDT), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/
01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limited-protections-for-lgbt/70766920/.
215
See Alan Blinder and Richard Perez-Pena, Georgia Governor Rejects Bill
Shielding Critics of Gay Marriage, NY TIMES (March 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/03/29/us/georgia-governor-rejects-bill-shielding-critics-of-gaymarriage.html?_r=0; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Mississippi passes religious freedom bill
that LGBT groups call discriminatory, CNN (April 6, 2016, 6:54 AM), http://www.cn
n.com/2016/04/05/us/mississippi-governor-signs-religious-freedom-bill/index.html.
209
210
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the battle lines drawn were similar: on one side were those
seeking to protect those individuals whose consciences precluded
them from complying with certain laws, and on the other, those
seeking to vigorously enforce those same laws—laws ostensibly
designed to grant and protect the rights of certain individuals. 216
These issues are felt most acutely when the religious exemptions
in question are asserted by a corporate claimant. For in
corporate and other business claimant cases, third-party harms
are both more frequently presented and typically more serious in
nature. An individual seeking a religious liberty exemption from
a state’s controlled substance abuse laws simply does not
ordinarily impinge upon the rights and privileges of his or her
fellow Americans the same way a business entity seeking a
religious liberty exemption from a state’s antidiscrimination laws
does. 217
Concrete examples of such claims implicating third-party
interests abound. Previously discussed were cases stemming
from the “contraceptive mandate” regulations issued pursuant to
the ACA. 218 These regulations forced companies to provide
health insurance coverage that subsidized products and
practices—more specifically, artificial birth control, including
abortifacient hormonal contraception—in contravention of the
religiously inspired principles upon which certain companies
were founded and pursuant to which they operated. 219 The
federal government, in promulgating these regulations,
ostensibly did so out of its understanding of what’s best for
women’s health. 220
See, e.g., Steve Sanders, RFRAs and Reasonableness, 91 IND. L.J. 243, 248–
49 (2016).
217
See Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86. This is because modern corporate free
exercise claims have been typically asserted against legislation and regulations
designed to protect third parties, and predicated upon the argument that obedience
to such laws would constitute illicit complicity with moral wrongdoing. See supra
text accompanying note 86. For a discussion of a traditional approach to the question
of moral complicity with wrongdoing (referred to as “cooperation with evil”), see
Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation With Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 89–97
(2009).
218
See supra text accompanying notes 83–88.
219
See id.
220
Madison Park, Birth Control Should be Fully Covered Under Health Plans,
Report Says, CNN (July 19, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/19/birth.
control.iom/ (cited in Genna Fasullo, Circumventing the Affordable Care Act
Contraceptive Mandate, 16 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 55, 55 n.1 (2013)).
216
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Prior to the ACA, similar issues arose with regard to health
care professionals who opposed, for reasons of religious
conscience, fulfilling certain prescriptions or participating in
A typical case would be that of a
certain procedures. 221
pharmacist objecting to the dispensing of emergency
contraceptives, which are viewed by many as abortifacient. 222
These cases were usually brought by individual pharmacists, but
there is no reason why they could not be brought by a pharmacy
itself, as some have been. 223
Another, more recent set of examples, stems from the advent
of same-sex marriage in the United States, and its interplay with
antidiscrimination laws, especially in the aftermath of Obergefell
v. Hodges. 224 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives rise to
“[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry.” 225 In one fell swoop,
Obergefell not only swept away laws that had recognized
marriage as solely between a man and woman, but also
effectively made opposition to same-sex marriage subject to state
antidiscrimination laws. The consequences of this have been
profound.
For in many jurisdictions prior to Obergefell, although
marriage was not extended to same-sex couples, homosexual
individuals
otherwise
enjoyed
the
same
familiar
antidiscrimination benefits that protected Americans against
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or creed. 226 This
221
See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does
Religion Make a Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 818–19 (2006); Francis J.
Manion, Protecting Conscience Through Litigation: Lessons Learned in the Land of
Blagojevich, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 369, 395–96 (2012).
222
See Manion, supra note 221. As for whether emergency contraception is
indeed abortifacient, compare Mathew Lu, Abortiofacients, Emergency
Contraception, and Terminating Pregnancy, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE: PUBLIC
DISCOURSE (April 4, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/04/12973/, with
OFFICE OF POPULATION RESEARCH, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Answers to Frequently
Asked Questions About . . . How Emergency Contraception Works, THE EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION
WEBSITE
(last
visited
Mar.
25,
2018),
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecabt.html.
223
E.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
224
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
225
Id. at 2602.
226
Such states would have included Hawaii (banning discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in employment and public accommodations, see HAW.
REV. STAT. § 378-2 and HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2, but also not recognizing same-sex
marriage until 2013, see H.B. 2312, 17th Leg. (Haw. 1994) (precluding same-sex
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limited the conflict between religious individuals and
antidiscrimination laws. 227 Indeed, state-based RFRA claims
prior to Obergefell, as a whole, were “exceedingly rare,” 228 and
conflict with antidiscrimination laws was only “occasional.” 229
With regard to RFRA-based challenges to antidiscrimination
laws, it should not come as much as a surprise that such
challenges were relatively rare before Obergefell. For although
there are very clear, longstanding religious traditions regarding
the nature and definition of marriage, none of these traditions—
of which I am aware—counsel in favor of discriminating carte
blanche against individuals qua individuals. 230 Put differently,
marriage), HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (recognizing same-sex marriage)); Nevada
(banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, see
Assemb. B. 311, 1999 Leg. (Nev. 1999), but also not recognizing same-sex marriage
until 2014, see NEV. CONST. Art. I, § 21 (precluding same-sex marriage), Latta v.
Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring recognition of same-sex
marriage)); Oregon (banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
housing, employment, and public accommodations; see OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030,
but also not recognizing same-sex marriage until 2014; see OR. CONST. Art. XV, § 5a
(precluding same-sex marriage), Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132–33
(D. Or. 2014) (requiring recognition of same-sex marriage)); and Wisconsin (banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see WIS. STAT. § 111.36 (1993), but
also not recognizing same-sex marriage until 2014, see WIS. CONST. Art. 13, § 13
(precluding same-sex marriage), Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014)
(requiring recognition of same-sex marriage)).
227
The conflict nevertheless still existed. See Melissa Fishman Cordish,
Comment, A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Free Exercise Rights and AntiDiscrimination Law, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2113, 2116–17 (1996).
228
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2010).
229
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America and the End of the Century, 16
J.L. & RELIG. 187, 209 (2001).
230
The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides an excellent example of this,
by simultaneously denouncing both homosexual activity and discrimination against
homosexual individuals:
2357 Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women
who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward
persons of the same sex. It has taken a great variety of forms through the
centuries and in different cultures. Its psychological genesis remains
largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents
homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared
that “homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.” They are contrary to
the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not
proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no
circumstances can they be approved.
2358 The number of men and women who have deep-seated homosexual
tendencies is not negligible. This inclination, which is objectively
disordered, constitutes for most of them a trial. They must be accepted with
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although many religions have a lot to say about marriage and
sexual ethics, none, to my knowledge, address less weighty
questions such as to whom may I sell a car, or whom may I
permit to use my laundromat? Thus, a devoutly religious
individual could typically remain fully faithful to his or her
understanding of marriage without ever running afoul of laws
protecting individuals from discrimination on account of their
sexual orientation. 231
Post-Obergefell, however, religious opposition to same-sex
marriage and discrimination against homosexual individuals has
been legally conflated. This gives rise to a serious predicament
for many of those who might be called upon to provide goods and
services for a same-sex wedding ceremony or celebration.
Consequently, photographers, florists, and bakers have made
headlines for refusing to violate their religious consciences in
order to comply with local antidiscrimination laws. 232
Perhaps no case illustrates this transformed landscape
better than the plight of Barronelle Stutzman, owner of Arlene’s
Flowers. 233 For ten years, she served, without incident, Rob
Ingersoll, one of her customers. According to Ms. Stutzman, they

respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign of unjust discrimination in
their regard should be avoided. These persons are called to fulfill God’s will
in their lives and, if they are Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the
Lord’s Cross the difficulties they may encounter from their condition.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2357, 2538 (1994).
231
One flashpoint, even pre-Obergefell, concerned landlords, some of whom
refused to lease apartments to unmarried couples. See Cordish, supra note 227, at
2113–14.
232
See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 711 (2014). It should be noted that even before Obergefell,
however, some disputes between wedding vendors and same-sex couples still
occurred, for even in states where same-sex marriage was not legal, same-sex
couples did celebrate their unions and in doing so called upon service providers who
had religious objections to these celebrations. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights,
Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL.
L. REV. 619, 621 (2015).
233
Barronelle Stutzman, Why a Friend Is Suing Me: The Arlene's Flowers Story,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/why-a-goodfriend-is-suing-me-the-arlenes-flowers-story [http://perma.cc/BU5V-ZS42] (cited in
Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas Nejaime
and Reva Siegal, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 399, 412 n.65 (2016); Washington v. Arlene’s
Flowers, 389 P.3d 543, 568 (Wash. 2017) (en banc) (holding that Stutzman’s refusal
to provide flowers for same-sex wedding constituted unlawful, unexcused
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of Washington law).
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“hit it off” due to their shared “artist’s eye.” 234 Although Mr.
Ingersoll “was in a relationship with a man,” and Ms. Stutzman
“was a Christian,” that “never clouded the friendship for either
[of them] or threatened [their] shared creativity.” 235
But then Mr. Ingersoll asked Ms. Stutzman to “design
something special to celebrate his upcoming wedding” to his male
partner. 236 This she could not, in good conscience, do, for reasons
that she explains well in her own words:
If all he’d asked for were prearranged flowers, I’d gladly have
provided them. If the celebration were for his partner’s
birthday, I’d have been delighted to pour my best into the
challenge. But as a Christian, weddings have a particular
significance.
Marriage does celebrate two people’s love for one another, but
its sacred meaning goes far beyond that. Surely without
intending to do so, Rob was asking me to choose between my
affection for him and my commitment to Christ. As deeply fond
as I am of Rob, my relationship with Jesus is everything to me.
Without Christ, I can do nothing. 237

Ms. Stutzman proceeded to suggest “three other nearby
florists” who she “knew would do an excellent job for this
celebration.” 238 She was promptly sued for discrimination. As
Ms. Stutzman explained, “[t]his case is not about refusing service
on the basis of sexual orientation or dislike for another person
who is preciously created in God’s image. I sold flowers to Rob
for years. I helped him find someone else to design his wedding
arrangements. I count him as a friend.” 239 Rather, it was about
obedience to one’s religiously informed conscience. 240
Opponents to religious liberty exemptions oftentimes
characterize the proponents of such exemptions as little more
than bigots. 241 Ms. Stutzman’s case belies that. 242 Indeed,
Stutzman, supra note 233.
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
See id.
241
E.g., Editorial, In Indiana, Using Religion as a Cover for Bigotry, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/opinion/in-indiana-usingreligion-as-a-cover-for-bigotry.html (cited in Koppelman, supra note 232, at 653
n.163); Shannon Gilreath and Ashley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious
Accomodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237, 246 (2016) (“[T]he
234
235
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perhaps the most well-known conscientious objection in all of
history to recognizing a particular marriage was that of St.
Thomas More, who famously died “the King’s good servant but
God’s first.” 243 That is, he died maintaining his opposition to the
King’s second marriage without harboring any recorded animus
whatsoever against King Henry VIII himself. 244
It is important to call to mind examples such as Ms.
Stutzman’s to underscore the point that principled opposition to
same-sex marriage, or abortion, or contraception—to take other
frequent examples—can exist without any animus toward those
individuals for whom antidiscrimination or access laws are
This is necessary to justify the
designed to protect. 245
compromise set forth below. Few, myself included, wish to
broker a compromise between laws safeguarding civil rights and
health care access on the one hand and the purveyors of bigotry
argument that anti-gay discrimination is somehow qualitatively different from antiblack discrimination is bunk. It is a convenient smoke screen enabling bigots to
mask their true animus.”).
242
Also belying such an ignorant mischaracterization of all who would dare seek
an exemption from the equal access / antidiscrimination laws as applied to
contraception and same sex marriage would be St. John Paul II’s “Theology of the
Body.” See JOHN PAUL II, MAN AND WOMAN HE CREATED THEM: A THEOLOGY OF THE
BODY (Michael Waldenstein, ed. & trans. 2006). This Article posits that no fair
minded person could, in good faith, ascribe bigotry to this work, which painstakingly
proffers an understanding of sex and marriage that precludes contraception and
other “illicit practices against generation.” See id. at 362–364, 628–639. John Paul
II’s writings do not address the issue of religious liberty exemptions. Nor do his
writings directly address the philosophical issue of whether one’s sale of artificial
birth control, abortifacients, or goods and services for use in a same-sex wedding
ceremony constitute what’s referred to as illicit “cooperation” in the conduct of their
purchasers. See, e.g., 1 KARL H. PESCHKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 320 (1986). Indeed,
within John Paul II’s Catholic tradition, it’s not entirely clear that an exemption
would be needed in all such situations. See Robert T. Miller, The Shopkeeper’s
Dilemma and Cooperation with Evil, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE: PUBLIC
DISCOURSE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/03/14423. But
John Paul II’s writings do make clear that the beliefs motivating religious liberty
exemption claims from the laws referenced above can very well be predicated upon
reason and serious philosophical principles—not simply, inevitably, or necessarily
bigotry and animus.
243
R. MARIUS, THOMAS MORE, A BIOGRAPHY 513–14 (1985), quoted in Stephen
M. Deitsch, Thomas More: A Fine Lawyer and a Fine Man, 17 DCBA Brief 12 (2004).
244
See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 403 (1998) (On the
morning of his execution, Thomas More remarked that “I have always been much
bounden to the king’s highness for the benefits and honours that he hath still from
time to time most bountifully heaped upon me . . . . I will not fail earnestly to pray
for his grace, both here and also in another world”).
245
See MARIUS, supra note 243.
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on the other, based upon some pretextual recourse to religious
liberty.
But certainly many who assert religiously based
objections to these laws do so in good faith, devoid of ill-will or
bad intent, giving lie to the widespread (mis)characterization of
such objectors.
Consequently, the issue of religious exemptions from laws
protecting third parties presents us with a very real clash of
important values. Or, perhaps more accurately, the imperfect
realization of one value: that of securing full citizenship to all
members of our society, especially to those who are members of
minority groups or otherwise vulnerable. Like a Rorschach test,
the previous sentence perhaps calls to mind different classes of
people depending upon the reader. 246 To some, homosexuals,
same-sex couples, and women are those vulnerable members of
our society who require the law’s protections. But to other
readers, those individuals who continue to adhere to certain
traditional religious views of marriage and sexual norms, against
the clear trajectory of modern opinion, constitute a vulnerable
minority. 247
Moreover, “people who decide that they do not want to trade
with or hire certain people” on such grounds “are making a
decision that has more than just external costs.” 248 For they
themselves “bear a large part of the costs . . . for their decisions
will surely limit their own opportunities for advancement and
success, even as it leaves others free to pursue alternate
opportunities.” 249 Despite its persistence, therefore, we ought not
forget that market-place discrimination ordinarily imposes real
costs upon the discriminator as well as upon the victim of
Consequently, there are “natural curbs”
discrimination. 250
against such economically inefficient behavior. 251
See Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 54
(2002) (discussing the Rorschach ink-blot test).
247
See Sanders, supra note 217, at 246–47 (2016). This has led Richard Epstein
to remark “In these settings, the utter inability to understand who is coercing whom
reveals the great danger of a kind of law that forces the unwilling to yield to its
commands when all they want is to be free to practice their own faith.” See Epstein,
Freedom of Association, supra note 13.
248
See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 41–42 (citing Gary S.
Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, ch. 3 (2nd ed., 1971).
249
Id.at 42.
250
Id.
251
Id. There is, perhaps, no more paradigmatic example of widespread
discrimination against a particular, vulnerable group than that of the American
246
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But not all contexts are identical. In some towns or regions,
the economic and material harms of discrimination may fall more
heavily upon one party versus another. In other words, which
group should more properly be characterized as “minority” or
more “vulnerable” perhaps turns best upon the venue or situation
in question. And that serves as a fitting segue to our advertence
to antitrust law.
A.

In Theory

Tasked with the unenviable responsibility of protecting
competition generally by curtailing certain forms of competition
individually, antitrust law lights the way forward. With over a
century of case law under its belt, antitrust law has learned to
address the tension inherent in its mandate by recognizing the
critical importance of context. 252 For in the light of context,
conduct that can be deemed reasonable or fair for one firm can be
deemed unreasonable or unfair when undertaken by another.
Further, even conduct engaged in by the very same firm could be
deemed reasonable versus unreasonable depending upon the
time, place, and circumstances of its engagement.
For, as we have seen, “context” here means, primarily,
market power. 253 When a firm lacks market power its ability to
compete unfairly, and to harm consumers, is significantly
impeded. In the absence of market power, consumers, venders,
suppliers, and actors throughout the marketplace ordinarily have
alternatives to which they can turn in the face of a firm’s
South during the Jim Crow era. This causes many to question the efficacy of the
market’s “natural curbs” against discrimination. Richard Epstein offers an
interesting counter-interpretation of this example:
The history of failure in the South is not a history of the failure of
individual character or individual will. It is not a history of the failure of
markets . . . . To the contrary, the lessons from our history of civil rights all
stem from two sources: first, the abnegation of the principles of limited
government, that is, government restricted to those areas where it is
required, such as taxation and law enforcement; and second, the massive
state legislative regulation of private markets that was left unchecked by
passive judicial action.
Id. at 94. Epstein proceeds to point out that the notorious Supreme Court
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which centered upon a
Louisiana statute (the “Separate Car Act”) requiring racial segregation on
railways, suggests that the state’s private railways “were—or, more likely,
had become—unwilling to practice racial discrimination.” Id. at 102.
252
See supra Part II.D.
253
See id.
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misconduct. Conversely, a firm in possession of market power
may be able to impose its will upon consumers and other
marketplace participants to their detriment.
Although
antitrust
law
is
not
analogous
to
antidiscrimination law, or to the law of religious liberty, its focus
on market power is nevertheless a helpful tool for addressing the
dilemma of corporate free exercise exemptions. For, as with
antitrust, a firm’s market power could be used as a proxy to
gauge how harmful to third-party interests that firm’s
misconduct could be in the context of religious liberty
exemptions. In the realm of religious liberty exemptions, the
“misconduct” referred to is that behavior that violates a law of
general applicability designed to protect or further some thirdparty interest. A firm with marginal market share is simply not
in a position to inflict the same degree of harm that a firm with
dominant market share is.
Harkening back to some of the real-life examples identified
above, consider the question of access to birth control, or the
procurement of a wedding cake: a business lacking any
appreciable market power will simply not be able to frustrate
public policy objectives the way a business with sizeable market
power could. A family-owned drugstore in Manhattan, or a
bakery in Jersey City, regardless of how restrictive its policies
might be, will simply not be able to prevent someone from
obtaining contraceptives or catering services. As such, granting
religious liberty exemptions to such drugstores or bakeries
should not be viewed as overly problematic. Moreover, in
balancing the harms that would accrue to the parties involved,
granting the exemption in such circumstances seems to be the
fairest approach.
We have previously addressed the important values that a
robust approach to religious liberty protects. 254 Bluntly put, a
modern, civilized society generally avoids forcing its members to
choose between God and Caesar.
History and philosophy
strongly attest to such a careful approach—both of which were
well understood by the men and women who founded the United
States. 255 This suggests that, for reasons both normative and

254
255

See supra Part I.A.
See id.
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practical, we find a way to accommodate the religious convictions
and consciences of our fellow Americans to the widest extent
reasonably possible.
Of course, laws designed to ensure access to goods and
services, be they antidiscrimination laws or certain health care
regulations, also serve valuable and important purposes.
Primarily, they serve to ensure said access or to “ameliorat[e]
economic inequality.” 256 But they also serve to recognize, foster,
and protect, at the behest of the state, the equal dignity of the
individuals on whose behalf they have been promulgated. 257 In
light of these dual objectives, how could a religious
accommodation ever be justified? For even if the firm seeking an
objection lacks market power, its very ability to decline its goods
or services to a protected third party implicates this secondary
purpose of the law in question, that regarding equal dignity.
The justification lies in recognizing, as has been suggested
previously, the intractable, zero-sum game at play when it comes
to the question of dignity. There is no way around this facet of
the dilemma: either the dignity of the religious claimant will be
infringed upon, or that of the protected third party. In such
situations, the state should not “take sides” and value the dignity
of one group of citizens over another. 258 The state ought not to,
through its weight and coercive power, prioritize these groups as
first class versus second class, subjugating the dignity interests
of one to the dignity interests of the other. 259 Instead, in such
Koppelman, supra note 232, at 627.
See Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2574–78; Neil S. Siegel & Reva B.
Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 349, 349–50
(2015).
258
Cf. See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 498 (there is no
easy way “to trade off symbol against symbol, or different symbolic views of the same
legal rules against one another. Given the limits of our knowledge . . . the best way
to take into account the full range of symbols, good and bad, noble and vain, is for
the legal system to ignore them all.”).
259
See also id. at 497 (“The problem of social governance . . . requires that we
make peace not with our friends but with our enemies, and this can be done only if
we show some respect for their preferences even when we detest them.”). Although
the government ought not to prioritize one class of claimants against the other here,
a strong argument could be made that the free exercise/religious liberty claimants
are entitled to prioritization. For a truly neutral state of affairs would be one in
which the government prescinds from interfering with private ordering. It is only
because of government’s interference, in the form of civil rights legislation for
example, that the conflict between rights even arises. Absent the government’s
involvement, all parties, both buyers and sellers, employers and employees, would be
256
257
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situations, the law should proceed by examining other, more
practical and objective factors at play. A review of these factors
helps elucidate the benefits of pursuing an approach to corporate
free exercise exemptions predicated upon market power. 260
Let’s consider the repercussions of a regime that grants,
versus one that denies, a religious liberty exemption on the basis
of market power. To facilitate matters, let’s take a concrete
example: the case of a family-owned pharmacy that, on account of
the family’s religious beliefs, does not sell artificial birth control.
The pharmacy seeks an exemption from a state law mandating
that all pharmacies within its jurisdiction stock and supply
certain forms of artificial birth control.
With regard to the dignity question, recognition of a religious
exemption for objecting pharmacies effectuates a policy of state
neutrality. By mandating, generally, the widespread availability
of artificial contraception, the state cannot be accused of failing
to respect the equality or dignity of women and their choices. 261
And by coupling this legislation with an exemption for religiously
based conscientious objection, the law would be countenancing a
narrow exception that could not fairly be said to swallow the rule.
But the exemption, though narrow, would broadcast the same
affirming message to religious individuals that the general
legislation broadcast to the state’s birth-control using population:
that their concerns are valid and that they have a right to live
out their lives in conformity with their values. Expressed in
mathematical language, these “dignity” concerns appear to cancel
each other out. 262 Since effectuation of these principles is a

free to exercise their consciences as best seen fit. As such, religious liberty
exemptions merely return the situation to its state of affairs ex ante, prior to the
time in which the government decided to interfere with private ordering via its legal
circumscription of prejudice, protection, and / or preference.
260
Cf. Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims
Have in Common, 5 NW J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 206, 212–26 (2010).
261
At least to those who believe that the dignity and equality of women is a
function of the availability of artificial birth control. See Seigel and Seigel, supra
note 257, at 349–50.
262
But see Nejaime and Siegel, supra note 86, at 2580 (asserting that an
accommodation that would inflict either a “material or dignitary harm” to a
protected third-party would implicate a compelling government interest) (emphasis
added).
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matter of abstraction, this conclusion would be the same
regardless of whether the pharmacy possessed or lacked market
power. 263
Although market power could arguably impact our
assessment of dignitary harm—by helping us to assess how
widespread and common denials of service might be—its
presence or absence plays a particularly important role with
respect to our analysis of the material harm that an exemption
may inflict or prevent. Put differently, market power helps us
assess the practical ability of parties to conduct themselves in
accordance with their principles and values in light of a potential
religious liberty exemption from a law of general applicability. If
a pharmacy lacks market power—meaning that it has multiple
nearby competitors—granting an exemption to a law requiring
pharmacies to stock and dispense artificial birth control pills and
devices would allow the pharmacy to remain true to its principles
without denying the protected third-parties the practical value of
the law—namely, ready access to artificial contraception. 264 As
263
That said, some commentators call into question the weight of dignitary
harms that are rare or unusual in nature. As Andy Koppelman has written, “[t]he
sense of insult and dehumanization” that accompanies a refusal of service “depends
in part on systemic effects that go beyond the particular transaction. An insult that
is unusual loses much of its sting.” See Koppelman, supra note 232, at 645. This
suggests that, contrary to my inclination, market power is not irrelevant to the
“dignity harm” analysis. Moreover, other scholars have pointed out that, in the free
speech context at least, “the Supreme Court has consistently held that a
government’s desire to protect people from emotional harm . . . does not constitute a
compelling government interest.” See Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi,
Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious
Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV 1595, 1624 (2018). Indeed, as these scholars have
pointed out: “it is difficult to imagine more excruciating humiliation, degradation, or
emotional harm than that endured by the father who saw Westboro Baptist Church
picketers with signs stating ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going to Hell,’ and ‘God Hates
You’ at the funeral of his son,” yet that has been upheld as protected First
Amendment activity. Id. This serves to underscore the propriety of focusing on the
access to goods and services objective of antidiscrimination law when challenged on
First Amendment Free Exercise grounds as applied to certain religious minorities.
264
It must be recognized that the possibility exists for material harm to be
inflicted by religious liberty exemptions or accommodations even in a market in
which no single firm wields market power. For a situation could arise where all or
most firms in a competitive market refuse to provide a particular good or service in
question to the detriment of a protected third-party interest. Were this situation the
result of intentional coordination among the firms, antitrust law again would
furnish us with an answer. Under antitrust law, it is unlawful for a group of firms
with market power to do that which a single firm with market power could not do.
See supra text accompanying note 128 (“Every contract, combination in the form of
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Richard Epstein has noted, “the critical question for [a person’s]
welfare is not which opportunities are lost but which are
retained.” 265
Conversely, denying the exemption in such circumstances
provides little practical benefit to the law’s beneficiaries because,
as stated, multiple other pharmacies exist that would readily
supply the products in question, but would have the devastating
effect of precluding the pharmacy from operating in accordance
with the religious principles upon which it was founded. In
practical terms, this would probably put the pharmacy out of
business. As one commentator explained, using a different
example:
Denials of service do affect gay couples by causing them
disturbance, hurt, and offense. While acknowledging that
harm, one must also acknowledge, I think, that the harm to the
objector from legal sanctions is greater and more concrete. In
most cases, the offended couple can go to the next entry in the
phone book or the Google result. The individual or organization
held liable for discrimination, by contrast, must either violate
the tenets of her (its) faith or else exit the social service,
profession, or livelihood in which she (it) has invested time,
effort, and money. One simply has not given the religious
dissenter’s interest significant weight if one finds that offense or
disturbance from messages of disapproval are sufficient to
override it. . . . “[A]ctual people should not be harmed for the
sake of symbolic gestures.” 266
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to
be illegal.”). Analogously, a religious liberty exemption should be denied to any firm
in a group of firms that (1) collectively possess market power and (2) conspire to
deny a particular product or service to a protected third-party population.
But what if this apparent conspiracy is instead the result of separate, individual,
non-coordinated decisions? What if the firms and their managers simply adhere to a
similar set of values and beliefs, and as such conduct themselves similarly without
any collaboration between or among them?
No obvious answers present themselves. But based upon the principle, articulated
previously, that a religious exemption should not cause material, objective harm to a
third-party interest, see supra text accompanying note 268, it would stand to reason
that the exemption should not be recognized in such cases for at least one of these
companies.
265
See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 13, at 30.
266
Berg, supra note 260, at 229 (pointing out that many of the proponents and
opponents of religious liberty exemptions to laws protecting third parties predicate
their arguments upon similar principles: (1) the importance of conduct fundamental
to identity, (2) the right to live out one’s life publicly in civil society, and (3) the
claimed virtuousness, or objective value, of the rights they seek to protect). See also
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However, if the pharmacy in question possesses market
power—meaning that it has few nearby competitors—granting
an exemption to the law would seriously undermine the access to
contraception that the law was designed to secure. This, in turn,
would infringe upon the practical, versus solely the expressive,
value of the law. Consequently, these circumstances give rise to
a relatively stronger argument against recognizing an exemption.
One could nevertheless fairly question the wisdom of
denying an exemption, even under these circumstances. For if,
as posited, obedience to the law would require the pharmacy to
violate certain core religious values, would not the denial of an
exemption simply lead to the pharmacy’s closure? How would
that promote greater access to contraception? And how does that
appropriately safeguard the religious liberty interests of the
pharmacy?
As with all compromises, a certain level of messiness
undeniably abounds. It must be admitted that, by insisting upon
compliance with the law in situations where a company possesses
market power, this approach runs the risk of simply driving such
companies out of business. But without getting too far afield,
economics would suggest that the same community that
supported this particular pharmacy would probably be able to
support a replacement. 267 In other words, it stands to reason
that there is indeed a market for a pharmacy in the community
in question, and the departure of one should lead to the arrival of
another.
With regard to the question of religious liberty, it bears
recognizing that as with all rights, an outer boundary must be
drawn somewhere. It would seem to be a reasonably fair—and
perhaps to some, a generously fair—place to draw such a
boundary where a putative exemption from a law of general
applicability would do actual, material harm to a protected thirdparty interest. Indeed, such a parameter is largely in keeping

Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 13 (“The plea of personal
anguish . . . from not being served carries no more weight in this context than it does
in any other: get over it, tell your friends not to patronize the store, or write an
angry letter to the local newspaper . . . . [But] the ultimatum to either perform
services against conscience or go out of business causes anguish to those whose
options in the business world are starkly limited by an intolerant majority . . . .”).
267
See Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 13.
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with the American religious liberty as traditionally understood
by some of its most ardent advocates. 268
Douglas Laycock reached a similar conclusion in a
compromise he suggested to the issue of religious exemptions
from laws that protect third-party interests. In his typically
balanced, even-handed fashion, Professor Laycock wrote:
The first step [to a solution] for the religious side would be to
focus on protecting its own liberty, and to give up on regulating
other people’s liberty. That is, the religious side would have to
stop seeking legal restrictions on other people’s sex lives and
other people’s relationships. . . .
[T]he advocates of sexual liberty and marriage equality would
have to agree . . . that it is far more important to protect their
own liberty than to restrict the liberty of religious
conservatives. They would agree not to demand that religious
individuals or institutions assist or facilitate practices they
consider immoral, except—and this is an important exception—
where the goods or services requested are not available from
another reasonably convenient provider. Of course same-sex
couples should have a right to marry, and to as big a wedding as
they choose, and women should have a right to contraception,
but apart from local monopolies, they have no real need to
obtain those things from religious believers with deep moral
objections. A corollary of this solution is that Catholic hospitals
should not seek, and should not be permitted, to acquire local
monopolies over women’s health care. Those who seek to live by
their own values should avoid acquiring monopolies that block
that same possibility for others. 269

B. In Practice
Implementation of an antitrust-inspired approach to
corporate free exercise exemptions could be accomplished via a
number of ways. This Part sketches out the three most probable.
1.

Regulatory

Much of the law that regulates businesses is administrative
in nature. Indeed, the contraceptive mandate that precipitated
the Hobby Lobby case was exactly that: a Health and Human

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 839, 878–79 (2014).
268
269
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Services regulation. 270 Prior to promulgating their regulations,
administrative agencies are ordinarily required to circulate their
proposals for notice and comment. 271 Properly conducted, this
circulation should bring to light many—hopefully most—
potential problems that the proposed regulation would present to
certain individuals on account of their religious beliefs and/or
practices.
In response to this information, administrative
agencies would be well-advised to craft religious exemptions to
effectuate the principles outlined above. Namely, generous
exemptions for firms and businesses to the extent that they lack
market power. This is completely within their power under the
First Amendment, as explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court
in Employment Division v. Smith. 272
2.

Legislative

Administrative agencies are beholden to their enabling
legislation, and ordinarily tasked with the enforcement of certain
laws passed by the legislatures of their jurisdictions. As such,
legislatures, both state and federal, could be more cognizant of
potential conflicts between the law and religiously grounded
businesses, and build religious exemptions, along the lines set
forth in this article, into any newly proposed legislation.
To the extent that RFRA and state-RFRAs are yielding
unsatisfactory results, Congress and state legislatures could also
consider amending these statutes. Such amendments, with
respect to business entities, could both strengthen the protections
afforded to religiously grounded businesses, while at the same
time limiting their applicability only to those businesses that
lack market power. Given that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby was a
decision interpreting RFRA, and not the First Amendment per se,
such an undertaking could effectively calibrate the Hobby Lobby
decision as best deemed fit.
3.

Judicial

Political will may not exist to propose new RFRAs or amend
old RFRAs. Further, administrative agencies may lack the
energy or resources to take into account all of the potential
See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative
Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011).
272
See supra text accompanying note 41.
270
271
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religious liberty implications of the regulations they promulgate.
Consequently, if all else fails, the judiciary could readily
effectuate the principles outlined in this article in their rendering
of RFRA and state-RFRAs—and even the First Amendment to
the extent applicable.
In all the cases appropriately brought under RFRA, as well
as practically all the cases brought under state RFRAs, and in a
narrow band of cases brought under the First Amendment
itself, 273 the government is put to the burden of demonstrating a
“compelling government interest” in order to prevail in denying
the sought-after exemption. 274 In assessing whether this burden
has been met, with regard to corporate claimants, courts could
consider the market power of said claimants. In other words,
courts could factor into their analysis the degree to which a
corporate claimant wields market power.
The greater a
claimant’s market power, the more compelling the government’s
interest as to that claimant if the law is one concerning access or
antidiscrimination. 275
C. Additional Considerations
This article has illustrated a path forward in very broad
strokes. The initial decision to lump together all for-profit
business entities under the phrase “corporate free exercise” is,
admittedly, subject to challenge.
There are significant
differences that characterize sole proprietorships, partnerships,
and business corporations—differences that could very well
impact the strength or the availability of free exercise claims. I
freely recognize this, and welcome further scholarship
delineating the religious liberty claims of these entities.
Nevertheless, the relevancy of this article’s argument persists: in
commercial contexts, where a claimant’s free exercise claim
would impose costs on another party, market power ought to
factor into the exemption analysis.
Additional fine-tuning would also be welcome with respect to
the nature of the parties upon whom an exemption’s costs would
fall. More specifically, a distinction could fairly be made between
See supra notes 35–37.
See Julian Ellis & David M. Hyams, RFRA: Circuits Spit on “Compelling
Government Interest”, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 37 (2015).
275
Of course, laws regarding public health or safety, or similar matters, should
be enforced across the board regardless of a firm’s market power.
273
274
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customers and employees.
Differences between these two
disparate groups might suggest a different approach with regard
to free exercise exemptions impacting their particular rights and
privileges.
But again, this article’s central argument still
applies, or at least could be applied, to free exercise claims a
ffecting both of these groups.
Finally, distinctions could be made among the contexts
within which corporate free exercise exemptions might be sought.
One important distinction would be between the “access” cases
and the “discrimination” cases. By “access cases” this article
refers to the contraceptive access situation, and analogous
situations, where a pharmacist or pharmacy refuses to fulfill
prescriptions for contraception, or where an employer refuses to
comply with the “contraceptive mandate” of the ACA. 276
Assuming that this refusal is applied to both male and female
forms of contraception, it doesn’t implicate gender discrimination
per se, but rather access to a particular good or service. 277 As
such, the “dignitary” harms implicated in other contexts are at
their nadir in this situation. 278 All things being equal, this would
militate in favor of granting the free exercise exemption sought.
Moreover, it should be noted that although this article has
focused on the “compelling government interest” prong of the free
exercise exemption issue, an important second prong applies as
well: that the government utilize the means least restrictive to
an infringement upon religious liberty in pursuing its
objective. 279 Given that the government’s predominant objective
in the access context is simply access to a particular good or
service, there are certainly ways in which the government can
provide such access without commandeering the cooperation of
See supra notes 83–84.
Oftentimes such refusals are limited to contraception that is arguably
abortifacient in nature. As only women can conceive, such refusals admittedly blur
the line between the “contraceptive access” category and gender discrimination.
Although many have asserted that to be “anti-abortion” is to be “anti-woman,” the
profound divisions that persist over the question of abortion, including divisions that
cut across gender lines, suggest that such an assertion is at best a grossly inaccurate
oversimplification of the issue. E.g., Thomas C. Berg, Pro-Life Progressivism and the
Fourth Option in American Public Life, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 235, 237 (2005)
(highlighting “pro-life feminists” such as Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
and the organization “Feminists for Life of America, which describes itself as ‘prowoman, pro-life’ ”).
278
See supra notes 257–260 and accompanying text.
279
See supra text accompanying note 44.
276
277
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those individuals and companies religiously opposed to this.
Indeed, this was one of the factors that defeated the Obama
Administration’s arguments against recognition of an exemption
to the contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby. 280 It would seem,
therefore, that within this particular context, a business’s
religious liberty exemption claim would be strong even if it
wielded significant market power.
The other category of exemptions is those pertaining to
antidiscrimination laws. Here too, others have attempted to
further categorize these situations. Many have argued that there
is a principled distinction between discriminating against a
person’s status, for example his or her sexual orientation, versus
prescinding from any involvement in that person’s conduct—such
as his or her marriage celebration. 281 Others have posited that
when it comes to discrimination, “race is different.” 282 Each of
these tempting distinctions is saddled with serious shortcomings,
but neither is devoid of merit. Contrary to what some contend,
these distinctions, even if not wholly persuasive, are indeed
rational and worthy of serious consideration. They may serve as
non-dispositive yet influential factors bearing upon the path
forward.
Most people can appreciate the difference between refusing
to serve someone because of who they are and refusing to support
or contribute to, in some way, another’s decisions or actions. The
latter ground of refusal resonates as more reasonable, and,
moreover, more legitimately the subject of a proper religious
exemption. This argument has a distinguished pedigree, dating
back to at least St. Augustine, who wrote “cum dilectione
hominum et odio vitiorum,” which has been roughly translated as
“love the sinner but hate the sin.” 283 Consider whether Ms.
Stutzman would have violated Washington’s antidiscrimination
ordinance had she refused to sell a celebratory floral
arrangement to a heterosexual individual whose expressed
intention was to give the flowers to a same-sex couple on their
See 134 S. Ct. at 2781−82.
See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 241. This argument has, admittedly, not met
with much success in the courts. E.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d
272, 281 (Colo. App. 2015).
282
See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty,
92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 837–42 (2014).
283
Cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 37 (4th ed. 1992).
280
281
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wedding day. If this would not constitute a violation, the law
would seem to countenance St, Augustine’s aforementioned
distinction. If, on the other hand, this would constitute a
violation, the law would seem to be punishing individuals for
their beliefs per se—as in the hypothetical, the refusal is made to
an individual who does not fall within a protected class.
But two difficulties interpose themselves. First, the statusconduct distinction, if pushed too hard, tends to break down—
especially with regard to the context of same-sex marriage. The
line between not serving an individual because of his or her
sexual orientation (status), versus his or her spousal choice
(conduct), is, admittedly, a thin one.
Second, there is also the problem of suggesting that certain
objections are “properly” religious, such as those pertaining to
conduct, and that some are not, such as those pertaining to
status. Although this may comport with the understanding of
religion shared by most, the entire point of religious liberty
exemptions is to protect those whose religious beliefs are not
within the mainstream.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the distinction
between status and conduct ought not be completely abandoned.
Sophistry must be avoided.
The recognition of religious
exemptions, both in the judicial crafting thereof, but especially
when they are created as an accommodation via legislative or
regulatory action, is all about line-drawing. It is not wrongful to
employ rules of thumb, as rough as they may be, as factors to be
considered. In short, it is not unprincipled, in recognizing an
exemption, to weigh differently an exemption that would
sanction discrimination obviously predicated upon status alone
versus an exemption that can more fairly be ascribed as
pertaining to conduct.
A similar line of reasoning justifies the “race is different”
distinction.
Slavery, the Civil War, three constitutional
amendments, and state-enforced segregation all combine to
attest to a uniquely problematic history of racial discrimination
that is, arguably, different in kind than all other forms of
discrimination in America. As such, it would not be indefensible,
in crafting religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws, to
treat antidiscrimination laws relating to race differently from
those relating to other characteristics.

FINAL_COLOMBO

2018]

9/13/2018 11:15 AM

AN ANTITRUST APPROACH TO FREE EXERCISE

87

Finally, it should not be denied that, today at least, the
controversy over LGBT antidiscrimination laws, when applied to
the context of marriage, implicates religious conscience to a
degree that other antidiscrimination laws do not. Indeed,
exceedingly few individuals today advance religious arguments to
justify most other forms of discrimination, whereas large
numbers of individuals do indeed advance religious arguments in
opposition to marriage arrangements other than one man, one
woman.
Of course, apparently genuine religious arguments have
been historically raised to justify all sorts of discriminatory
atrocities, ranging from slavery to the Jim Crow laws. 284 As
someone with more than a passing familiarity with the Bible,
and who believes that some interpretations thereof are
objectively strong while others are objectively weak, I admittedly
have difficulty understanding how some have used the Bible to
justify racism, and how those justifications could be deemed
credible by anyone. For example, the “dangers of miscegenation”
purportedly received support from Genesis, where “the serpent
was in fact a metaphor for a ‘pre-Adamite . . . negro gardener’
who had tempted and, presumably, penetrated Eve.” 285 Really?
To somehow equate that interpretation to, for example, the
biblical exegesis and philosophical thought of Pope Benedict XVI
on marriage 286 is, I suggest, ludicrous. Put differently, just
because someone says the Bible says something, doesn’t make it
so.
In response, many would be quick to suggest that in years to
come, religious arguments concerning marriage will appear as
frivolous and pretextual in retrospect as do the religious
objections to desegregation or miscegenation in our own time.
Indeed, there are those who assert that the religious arguments
against same-sex marriage are frivolous and pretextual
already. 287 But that is, of course, not a foregone conclusion.
Moreover, it is certainly not the situation today.
284
See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often
Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L.
REV. 657, 678–79 (2011).
285
Gilreath & Ward, supra note 241, at 262–63.
286
See generally BENEDICT XVI, ADDRESS OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI ON
THE OCCASION OF CHRISTMAS GREETINGS TO THE ROMAN CURIA (2012).
287
See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 241, at 258–67.
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On the one hand, none of this matters. For, as mentioned
previously, religious liberty exemptions are necessary precisely
when one’s religious beliefs are idiosyncratic and lack sufficient
public support to be otherwise protected. On the other hand,
however, it’s not sensible to turn a blind eye to the realities of our
current situation.
Whatever the past has held, and whatever the future may
hold, in our own time a critical mass of people, otherwise devoid
of any hint of malice or homophobia, have stepped forward and
voiced serious objection to same-sex marriage—an objection so
deep that, as merchants and businesspeople, they refuse to
provide goods or services to same-sex wedding celebrations.
Although there are those who would demonize these fellow
citizens, for reasons already addressed such demonization is both
unfair and ignorant. 288 In short, there is a qualitative difference
between the 21st century racist and the 21st century opponent to
same-sex marriage. It is likely that this difference does not hold
with regard to every individual in each of these two camps. But
as the example of Barronelle Stutzman makes clear, this
difference certainly holds for some. 289 Courts, legislatures, and
administrative agencies should not ignore the reality of this
phenomenon in its evaluation of religious liberty exemption
claims. Indeed, the phenomenon of persistent opposition to
involvement in same-sex weddings by individuals of apparent
good will and otherwise devoid of prejudice should rightfully be
considered as an important factor in evaluating the promulgation
of exemptions in the context of antidiscrimination laws as
applied to same-sex weddings.
CONCLUSION
This article posits a way of utilizing the insights of antitrust
law to help resolve the seemingly intractable dilemma of
corporate religious liberty exemptions.
Admittedly, it’s not intractable to everyone. To some,
corporate religious liberty rights ought to be coextensive with
individual religious liberty rights. 290 To others, as marketplace

See supra text accompanying notes 233−245; see also supra note 242.
See supra text accompanying notes 233−245.
290
See Mark Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there Religious Liberty for
Moneymakers? 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 116 (2013).
288
289
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participants, businesses and companies are held to standards
that differ from that of individuals, making them justly subject to
laws and regulations that private persons are not. 291
But to others still, and perhaps the smallest category of
commentators of all, some middle path must be forged: a path
respectful of both the genuine religious liberty concerns that
undergird corporate religious liberty and of protecting those
rights and privileges that society has deemed worthy of
protection. With this contribution, I lend my voice and reasoning
to this category of commentators. In a society that truly
cherishes the pluralism and diversity that it purports to, a simple
one-size-fits-all approach that bulldozes all in its way is
inappropriate and unjustifiable.
Unfortunately, the will to find some common ground in this
area seems to be lessoning. In his rightly acclaimed book
“Reclaiming Hope,” Michael Wear, director of Barack Obama’s
faith efforts and staff member of the Obama Administration’s
Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, observed
how, from his vantage point, the appetite for compromise and a
genuine embrace of diversity had diminished over the course of
four short years. 292 Comparing Obama’s 2009 inauguration
versus his 2013 inauguration, Wear commented:
In 2009, our diversity demanded we accept that there will be
voices we disagree with in public places. In 2013, diversity
required us to expel dissent . . . . In 2009, we had true pluralism
and the big American tent. In 2012, at the Democratic
convention, we had a pretense of inclusion and magnanimity for
political gain. In 2013, with our last four years in hand and the
“weight of history on our side” that pretense went out the
window. 293

Such an attitude does not bode well for those whose beliefs fail to
garner the support of governing majorities.
291
See James M. Oleske, Jr., The Public Meaning of RFRA versus Legislators’
Understanding of RLPA: A Response to Professor Laycock, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 125, 131–34 (2014).
292
MICHAEL R. WEAR, RECLAIMING HOPE: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE OBAMA
WHITE HOUSE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF FAITH IN AMERICA 187–188 (2017).
293
Id. at 188. Wear contrasted these attitudes to those of years earlier still:
“When George W. Bush was campaigning for a federal marriage amendment, he did
not campaign to revoke the tax status of the Episcopal Church [which had condoned
same-sex marriage] because its views on marriage were ‘fundamentally unAmerican.’ ” Id. at 223.
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Sun Tzu famously warned against driving one’s opponent
into a corner, 294 and the government’s unnecessarily heavyhanded approach to pushing a particular social agenda over the
last several years may be doing exactly that. 295 Although this
may ultimately break the backs of mere bigots, it is unlikely to
coerce into submission those individuals whose opposition arises
from genuine religious conscience.
For genuine religious
conscience is the stuff of which martyrs are made—not to
mention civil unrest and, historically, armed conflict. America’s
Founding Fathers were well aware of this, and recognized the
practical as well as the moral imperative to protect religious
conscious to the widest degree possible. As in so many matters,
we would do well to heed their wisdom and avoid forcing sincere
religious believers to choose between their livelihoods and
obedience to the law.

See SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 120–21 (Lionel Giles trans., Luzac & Co.
1910) (5th c. B.C.).
295
See Oleske, Jr., supra note 291, at 131–32; see generally Eskridge Jr., supra
note 284, at 657, 678–79, 719–20.
294

